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Tax Incentives for Support of the
Arts: In Defense of the
Charitable Deduction
I. Introduction
The deduction for charitable contributions authorized by Sec-
tion 170 of the Internal Revenue Code' has become almost as much
of a fixture of American economic life as the personal income tax
itself.2 Although the present form and complexity of the charitable
deduction bears little resemblence to the original provision enacted
in 1917, 3 the basic concept4 of the provision has remained the same,
1. Section 170 of the Internal Revenue Code permits the taxpayer to deduct contribu-
tions of cash and property from his adjusted gross income in amounts and under limitations
discussed in more detail at note 3 infra. See I.R.C. § 170. In order to qualify for the deduc-
tion, the contribution must be to a donee described in § 170(c) of the Code, which generally
are organizations that meet the requirements for tax exempt status under § 501. See note 6
Both the federal estate tax provisions and the federal gift tax provisions allow deductions
for gifts to charity, see §§ 2055 & 2522, but a discussion of those deductions is outside the
scope of this comment. As used in this comment, the term "charitable deduction" refers solely
to the deduction for income tax purposes, controlled by Section 170 of the Internal Revenue
Code.
2. For the historical background of the income tax, see generally R. PAUL, TAXATION IN
THE UNITED STATES (1954); RATNER, AMERICAN TAxATION (1942).
3. War Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, tit. xii, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300. The original 1917
provision allowed a deduction for
Contributions or gifts actually made within the year to corporations or associations
organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, or educational
purpose, or to societies for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part of
the net income of which inures to the benefit of any private stockholder or individual,
to an amount not in excess of 15 per centum of the taxpayers taxable net income as
computed without the benefit of this paragraph.
Id
Contrast the relative simplicity of the above language with the current provisions. See
I.R.C. § 170. The measurement and amount of the permissible charitable deduction varies
according to the nature of the donee institution and the type of property given. In general,
contributions to a public charity, see note 6 infra, may be deducted up to 50% of the taxpayer's
adjusted gross income, but gifts to a private foundation are limited to a 20% ceiling. Dona-
tions of cash are deductible on a dollar-for-dollar basis. Special rules, however, cover gifts of
appreciated property. The deduction for an in-kind gift of capital gain property is measured
by its fair market value on the date of gift, and may not exceed 30% of adjusted gross income,
but the deduction for ordinary income property is restricted to its adjusted basis, which is
generally the cost of the property. See discussion in text accompanying notes 20-28 infra. The
Code makes a final distinction between the types of capital gain property, that is, between
tangible personal property, on the one hand, and intangible personal property and real prop-
erty, on the other. Gifts of tangible personal property must meet an additional test. Tangible
personal property, paintings, statuary and other art objects, for example, must be used by the
donee public charity, the museum or arts organization, for purposes associated with the organ-
and has promoted5 gifts to educational, religious, cultural, and other
charitable6 organizations. For museums, the incentive provided by
section 170 to donate works of art is crucial.7
ization's tax exempt activity. If the use is not "related," the deduction for fair market value is
reduced by 40% of the appreciation. See notes 81-90 and accompanying text infra. The donor
may also elect to reduce his deduction for a contribution of capital gain property to a public
charity by 40% of the appreciated value. He is then permitted to deduct up to 50% of his
adjusted gross income. Finally, the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34,
§ 121, 95 Stat. 196 (1981), amending I.R.C. § 170, provides for a trial period in which a non-
itemizing taxpayer may deduct his contribution in addition to taking the standard deduction.
See notes 35, 176-77 and accompanying text infra.
4. See note 15 and accompanying text infra
5. The incentive effect of the charitable deduction will be considered at IVA.2. infra
6. The terms "charity" and "charitable organization" hereinafter refer to those catego-
ries of organizations described in section 170(c) of the Internal Revenue Code. The term
"public charity" hereinafter refers to the following charitable organizations described in sec-
tion 170(b):
(i) a church or a convention or association of churches,
(ii) an educational organization which normally maintains a regular faculty
and curriculum and normally has a regularly enrolled body of pupils or students in
attendance at the place where its educational activities are regularly carried on,
(iii) an organization the principal purpose or functions of which are the
providing of medical or hospital care or medical education or medical research, if the
organization is a hospital, or if the organization is a medical research organization
directly engaged in the continuous active conduct of medical research in conjunction
with a hospital, and during the calendar year in which the contribution is made such
organization is committed to spend such contributions for such research before Janu-
ary 1 of the fifth calendar year which begins after the date such contribution is made,
(iv) an organization which normally receives a substantial part of its support
(exclusive of income received in the exercise or performance by such organization of
its charitable, educational, or other purpose or function constituting the basis for its
exemption under section 501(a)) from the United States or any State or political sub-
division thereof or from direct or indirect contributions from the general public, and
which is organized and operated exclusively to receive, hold, invest, and administer
property and to make expenditures to or for the benefit of a college or university
which is an organization referred to in clause (ii) of this subparagraph and which is
an agency or instrumentality of a State or political subdivision thereof, or which is
owned or operated by a State or political subdivision thereof or by an agency or
instrumentality of one or more States or political subdivisions,
(v) a governmental unit referred to in subsection (c)(1),
(vi) an organization referred to in subsection (c)(2) [in general, a corporation,
trust, community chest or foundation organized and operated exclusively for charita-
ble purposes the earnings of which do not benefit a private individual] which nor-
mally receives a substantial part of its support (exclusive of income received in the
exercise or performance by such organization of its charitable, educational, or other
purpose or function constituting the basis for its exemption under section 501(a))
from a governmental unit referred to in subsection (c)(l) or from direct or indirect
contributions from the general public,
(vii) a private foundation described in subparagraph (D) [so-called "flow-
through" foundation], or
(viii) an organization described in section 509(a)(2) or (3).
I.R.C. § 170(b). Contributions to the above organizations are limited to 50% of adjusted gross
income. See note 3 supra.
The definition of "charity" and the identification of charitable objectives will necessarily
change as society's perception of social needs changes. For a discussion of what constitutes a
charity and the historical development of that concept, see IV. ScoTT ON TRUSTS §§ 368-377,
at 2853 (3d ed. 1967). ADLER, HISTORICAL ORIGIN OF TAX EXEMPTION OF CHARITABLE IN-
STITUTIONS (1922); Belknap, The Federal Income Tax Exemption of Charitable Organizations.-
Its History and Underlying Policy, in 4 COMMISSION ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY AND PUBLIC
NEEDS, U.S. DEP.T OF THE TREASURY, RESEARCH PAPERS 2025 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
COMMISSION RESEARCH PAPERS]; Persons, Osborn & Feldman, Criteria/or Exemption under
Section 501(c)(3), in 4 COMMISSION RESEARCH PAPERS 1909.
7. In his introductory address before the American Law Institute-American Bar Associ-
Recently this seemingly unassailable bastion of the Internal
Revenue Code has come under siege.' Critics have proposed drastic
modifications and restrictions of the provision, or its replacement by
alternative methods of stimulating charitable contributions.9
The attack on the charitable deduction was provoked to a large
extent by abuses in the valuation of appreciated property, and, in
particular, by over-valuations of gifts of art. Problems of enforce-
ment abound throughout the Internal Revenue Code, however, and
the Internal Revenue Service has already taken steps to remedy the
situation. 1 More serious are claims that the deduction is an ineffi-
cient and inequitable tool for promoting private giving. Although
these latter charges strike at the nature and rationale of the deduc-
tion system itself, particular approbation has been reserved for con-
tributions for appreciated art objects."
This comment will analyze the criticisms of the charitable de-
duction in light of tax equity and social policy considerations. Be-
cause direct government subsidies to the arts present difficulties of
accountability and control, 2 and because some tasks are more effi-
ciently and appropriately performed by the private sector, indirect
support of the arts through tax incentives should be preserved and
made more effective. At the same time, the incentive system should
ation Legal Problems of Museum Administration Course of Study, held in Philadelphia on
March 17-19, 1981, Peter Kyros referred to the charitable deduction as "still . . . the most
important museum program" on the part of the federal government. Address by Kyros, New
Congress and New Administration." The Outlookfor Museums, American Law Institute-Ameri-
can Bar Association Legal Problems of Museum Administration: Course of Study, in Phila-
delphia (March 17, 1981). Others involved in the arts have concurred in this assessment:
The enlightened policy our Government has followed in providing, since 1917, tax
incentives for private giving to the public domain has proved to be a successful stim-
ulant for contributions to our American museums. The tremendous achievements in
the growth of the collections of American art museums have been a direct result of
this wise policy.
Statement of Charles Van Ravenswaay, on behalf of Ass'n of Art Museum Directors, Hearings
on General Tax Reform Before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. 15, 6104 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 1973 Hearings]. See also Statement of Curt Lambrecht
on Behalf of the Southwest Minnesota Arts and Humanities Council and Statement of June R.
Goodman on Behalf of the American Arts Alliance and the Connecticut Commission on the
Arts, Hearings on S.219 Before the Senate Subcommittee on Taxation and Debt Management,
96th Cong., 2d Sess., 109, 9 111 (1980) [hereinafter cited as 1980 Hearings].
8. See, e.g., Hochman & Rodgers, The Optimal Tax Treatment of Charitable Contribu-
tions, 30 NAT'L TAX J. 1 (1977); Kahn, Personal Deductions in the Federal Income Tax in
NAT'L BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH FISCAL STUDIES No. 6 46 (1960); McDaniel, Federal
Matching Grants for Charitable Contributions." A Substitutefor the Income Tax Deduction, 27
TAX L. REV. 377 (1972); Rabin, Charitable Trusts and Charitable Deductions, 41 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 912 (1966); Speiller, The Favored Tax Treatment of Purchasers of Art, 80 COLUMBIA L.
REV. 214 (1980). Surrey, Federal Income Tax Reform.- The Varied Approaches Necessary to
Replace Tax Expenditures with Direct Government Assistance 84 HARv. L. REV. 352 (1970).
9. See notes 194, 250-268 and accompanying text infra.
10. See discussion at Ill. B. infra..
11. See discussion at IV. infra.
12. See Comment, Mechanismsfor Control and Distribution of Public Funds to the Art
Community, 85 DICK. L. REV. 629 (1981).
be designed to prevent unwarranted advantages or outright abuse of
the charitable deduction provision.
This comment will also examine the identity and motivations of
art purchasers and patrons, the numbers and needs of the "consum-
ers" served by art institutions, and the social and economic costs of
creating, collecting, preserving, and exhibiting art. Only after a care-
ful consideration of these factors can informed policy decisions be
made upon which will turn the proper tax treatment of art donors.
II. Historical Background
The deduction for contributions to charity was instituted in
1917,13 just four years after the establishment of the income tax it-
self.14 Because the Second Revenue Act of 1917 sharply increased
income taxes in order to raise funds to finance World War I, the
charitable deduction was proposed to encourage continued philan-
thropic giving in the face of a substantially larger tax bite. Propo-
nents believed that private donations would come from the
taxpayer's "surplus" income. They feared that if the surplus dollers
were diverted to taxes and the flow of private support dried up, char-
itable causes would require governmental funding generated
through yet greater taxation.1 5
Under the deduction scheme as originally, enacted, deductions
for in-kind gifts of appreciated property1 6 were treated as the
equivalent of a donation of cash equal to the fair market value of the
property.' 7 This treatment created two problems for the Internal
Revenue Service. First, some types of property, particularly works
of art, were not readily susceptible to measurement in monetary
terms. Appropriate valuation methods had to be devised. Second,
13. War Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, tit. xii, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300.
14. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114.
15. Wallace & Fisher, The Charitable Deduction Under Section 170 ofthe Internal Reve-
nue Code, in 4 COMMISSION RESEARCH PAPERS, supra note 6, at 2131. The basic premise for
the original enactment of the charitable provision was supplemented by two other justifica-
tions. First, supporters of the deduction reasoned that if an individual reduced his intended
gift to charity to the extent of the anticipated tax on that amount of income, the tax would
effectively be imposed on the charity. Second, advocates felt that an individual should be
taxed on that portion of his income that is devoted to charitable purposes, since it is not avail-
able for his private consumption. Id at 2132. Compare these theories with the arguments
advanced today in favor of retention of the deduction. See notes 159-163 and accompanying
text infra
16. The term "appreciated property" hereinafter includes all property, real, personal,
tangible, or intangible, that has a fair market value in excess of its cost.
The Internal Revenue Service does not permit a deduction for in-kind gifts of personal
services. Treas. Regs. §§ 1.170-2(a)(2) (1960) & 1.170A-l(g), T.D. 7207, 1972-2 I.R.B. 106, at
118.
17. "Fair market value" is defined by the regulations as "the price at which the property
would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any
compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts." Treas.
Reg. § 1.170-1(c)(1) (1960).
upon making a gift, the property donor did not realize gain for any
appreciation in value.18 For example, if the donor purchased a
painting for $10, paid in after-tax dollars, and the art work was
worth $100 at the time of taking a deduction, he could deduct $100
from his adjusted gross income. The $90 attributable to appreciation
escaped taxation, thus reducing his tax bill. Of course, the taxpayer
lost the opportunity to profit on a sale of the work or to continue his
personal enjoyment, but his tax benefits were still greater then the
advantages accorded to a cash contributor whose entire cash dona-
tion of $90 had previously been subject to tax.19
In addition, prior to 1969 high tax bracket donors could profit
handsomely from gifts of ordinary income property.2" If the tax-
payer in the above example gave a painting held for only six months
(ordinary income property), he saved $63 in taxes, based on the
highest 1969 rate of 70%.21 The $90 gain on a sale, in contrast,
would only have netted $27 in after-tax dollars.
The artist who donated his own work was particularly favored.
He received a deduction for the full fair market value. The appreci-
ation was never included in income, and his costs deducted in previ-
ous years as business expenses were not recaptured.22
18. See I.R.C. § 170(e)(1); Rev. Rul 55-410, 1955-1 C.B. 297. Valuation difficulties and
the escape of appreciation from taxation were two of the concerns underlying the elimination
of the fair market value rule as it applied to gifts of ordinary income property. See House
Ways and Means Committee Report, H.R. Rep. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 53-55 (1969),
(reprinted in 119691 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1700-01. See notes 20-28 and accompa-
nying text infra.
19. Assuming that both taxpayers are in the highest tax bracket of 50%, the relative bene-
fit to the cash contributor is a fifty percent savings in taxes, or $45. His gift leaves him out-of-
pocket $45. The donor of $90 in appreciation (the fair market value of the object less his
purchase cost) also applies that $90 against his income to save $45, but he could have sold the
painting and paid only $18 in capital gains tax because I.R.C. § 1202 limits the taxable portion
of capital gain to 40%. His net gain would be $72. Thus, the "price" of the latter taxpayer's
$90 gift is only $27 in out-of-pocket costs, the difference between his present tax savings of $45
and his "lost" after-tax profit on a sale.
Prior to the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 101, 95 Stat. 176
(1981), the incentive for wealthy taxpayers to give gifts of appreciated property was even
greater, because the former provisions taxed up to 70% of unearned income. Thus, at the
highest tax bracket, the lost profits of a gift were substantially reduced.
20. "Ordinary income property" is defined as property any portion of the gain on which
would not have been treated as a long-term capital gain if the property had been sold for its
fair market value by the donor at the time of the gift. See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-4(b)(l) (1972).
The ordinary income category includes inventories and stock-in-trade held primarily for sale
to customers in the ordinary course of business, I.R.C. § 122 1(1), a note or account receivable
acquired in the ordinary course of trade or business or from the sale of stock, 1.R.C. § 1221(4),
depreciable personal property and real property used in a trade or business, I.R.C. § 1221(2),
taxpayer-created property (or such property in the hands of a donee) including copyrights, and
literary, musical and artistic compositions, I.R.C. § 1221(3). Property that would otherwise
qualify as capital gain property that is held by the taxpayer for less than one year is treated as
ordinary income property for purposes of gain and taxed at ordinary income rates, I.R.C.
§§ 1222 & 1202.
21. It should be noted that the taxpayer would have had to earn considerably more than
$10 in order to have available $10 post-tax to cover the cost of the painting.
22. Beghe, The Artist The 4Ar Market and the Income Tax, 29 TAx L. REv. 491, 514 &
n.108 (1974).
This possibility of "profit" from a gift of ordinary income prop-
erty, including donor-created property, was eliminated in 1969 by
amendments to the Code23 that restricted the deduction for such gifts
to their adjusted basis,24 which is generally the cost of the property.
The 1969 revision brought immediate outcry from artists and chari-
table institutions alike.25 For an artist, the cost of materials is often a
mere fraction of the value of the completed work, and thus, the artist
receives a very small deduction for a very valuable work. Perhaps
the most extreme example of the inadequacy of the cost of materials
as a measure of an art work's value is found in the music field. A gift
of the lifetime collection of manuscripts by composer Igor Stravin-
sky, placed on the marketplace at an asking price of $3.5 million,
would yield a deduction solely for the cost of pen, paper, and ink.26
The reaction in Stravinsky's case, as in most other instances of artist-
donors, was to halt all gifts of donor-created property.27 Since the
23. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 5201(a)(l)(B), 93 Stat. 549. One of
the intended effects of the change was to disallow deduction treatment - and undue profit -
for the donation of public papers by politicians and public officers. Senator Church, introduc-
ing a bill to restore the full fair market value deduction for gifts of literary, artistic, and musi-
cal compositions, explained that "Congress swung too broad an axe. It not only eliminated the
deduction allowable for (the donations of public papers], but eliminated the deduction.
which had previously been granted to authors and artists." 119 CONG. REC. 5626 (1973).
24. Generally the cost of property is designated as its tax basis under I.R.C. § 1012, and
adjustments are made to that figure for capital expenditures, losses, and depreciation under the
rules set forth in I.R.C. § 1016. The result, "adjusted basis," is the tax cost of the property
from which the computation of gain or loss is determined upon the sale or exchange of the
property. I.R.C. § 1001.
25. See, e.g., THE VISUAL ARTIST AND THE LAW 76 n.26 (rev. ed. 1974), quoting Artists
Equity Newsletter (Oct. 1970); Statement of Elias Newman, President, Artists Equity Associa-
tion of New York and Chairman, Conference of American Artists, 1973 Hearings, supra note
7, at 6119. Letter from Thomas C. Colt, Jr., Director of the Dayton Art Institute to Elias
Newman (February 25, 1971), reprinted in Appendix to Statement Of Elias Newman, 1973
Hearings, supra note 7, at 6126. See also Joseph Maniscalco, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1174 (1978)
(denying deduction to artist who claimed unconstitutional discrimination).
26. Appendix to Statement of Elias Newman, President, Artists Equity Association of
New York and Chairman, Conference of American Artists, 1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at
6130. Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Stravinsky had been making periodic gifts of his
manuscript to the Library of Congress. Id
27. The Whitney Museum of American Art reported that in 1969 before the new provi-
sions became effective, the Museum received 81 paintings and sculptures and 61 prints as &ifts
from the artists. In 1970, the museum received only 4 paintings and sculptures and 13 prints.
The Museum of Modem Art reported gifts of 47 works in 1969, none in 1970, and only I in
1971. Statement of Ralph F. Colin, Administrative Vice-President and Counsel, Art Dealers
Association of America, Inc., 1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 6081.
Statistics from the Library of Congress are even more dramatic. Contributions of self-
generated manuscripts declined from approximately 230 musical manuscripts and 179,000 lit-
erary manuscripts annually to zero in 1970 and 1971. Letter from L. Quincy Mumford, Libra-
rian of Congress to Rep. Mills (Feb. 13, 1973), reprinted in 1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at
6287-88.
The larger, established institutions were not the only ones hurt by the disallowance of a
fair market value deduction for artists' gifts. Small museums and community art centers felt
the impact as well. See, e.g., letter from Glenn A. Anderson, Executive Director Anderson
Fine Arts Center, Anderson, Indiana, to Artists Equity Association (Feb. 25, 1971), reprinted in
Appendix to Statement of Elias Newman, 1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 6128.
Also severely affected by the 1969 amendments were hospitals and charitable relief orga-
nizations that depend on gifts of inventory from manufacturers and suppliers. CARE, for
1969 "reforms," numerous bills have been introduced into Congress
attempting to afford some measure of relief from the harshness of the
ordinary income rule as applied to artists.2"
A similar measure restricting the charitable deduction for capi-
tal gain property29 to cost was proposed in 1969, but last minute
pressure on Congress from museums, libraries and similar institu-
tions prevented its passage.30 In 1978, the capital gains taxation rates
were reduced to a ceiling of 28%,3' and in 1981, to 20%.32 In so do-
ing, Congress virtually eliminated the possibility that a collector
could benefit more from the donation of capital gain property than
from its sale, even though the deduction for the gift is calculated at
its fair market value. Because only 40% of capital gains are taxed
33
the effective tax rate on income from a sale could never have ex-
ceeded 28%, or 40% of the highest rate of 70%, under the former tax
rates. Under the new 1981 rates, it cannot exceed 20% (40% of the
highest rate of 50%).34 Thus, the greatest possible after tax profit is
80 cents on every dollar, but the possible tax saving from a charitable
deduction is limited to 50 cents per dollar.
The 1981 reduction of the maximum tax rate to 50% decreased
example, reported that in-kind contributions had fallen off by approximately two-thirds since
the 1969 amendment to the law. Statement of Frank L. Gofflo, Executive Director of CARE,
in 1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 6166. Consequently, a special provision was enacted to
allow a fair market value deduction, reduced by a percentage of the amount which would have
been ordinary income, for corporate donations of inventory to be used by a public charity
solely for the care of the ill, the needy, or infants. Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2135(a), 90 Stat. 1928
(1976) (adding I.R.C. § 170(e)(2)). A similar provision was added by the Economic Recovery
Tax Act of 1981 for contributions of research property to educational institutions. Pub. L. No.
97-34, § 222, 95 Stat. 248 (amending § 170(e)).
28. See VI. B. infra.
29. "Capital gain property" hereinafter refers to all property other than the categories of
ordinary income property listed in note 20 supra, that is held by the taxpayers for more than
one year. I.R.C. §§ 1221 & 1222. Gain on the sale or exchange of a capital asset is reduced by
60% before it is included in a taxpayer's income. I.R.C. § 1202. Under certain circumstances
depreciable property used in a taxpayer's trade or business, other than inventory, may be
treated as capital gain property. I.R.C. § 1231.
30. "It appears that the museum representatives were primarily concerned with preserv-
ing the full deduction for gifts of capital gain tangible personal property by collectors, whom
the museums considered to be their primary source of gifts of works of art." Beghe, supra note
22, at 518.
Legislative history indicates that the limitation of the charitable deduction to cost was not
extended to include gifts of appreciated property by collectcrs, that is, capital gain property,
for two reasons. First, the impact on cultural and charitable institutions was recognized as
unduly severe; and second, problems of evaluation would remain even if the appreciation were
taxed as capital gain. See Statement of Edwin S. Cohen, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury
for Tax Policy, Hearings on H. 13270 Before the Senate Committee on Finance, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 1, at 570-71 (1969). S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 82 (1969), reprintedin
(19691 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2111.
31. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, §§ 402(a)(c)(1), 92 Stat. 2763 (amending
I.R.C. § 1202 to increase the capital gain deduction from 50% to 60% of the amount of net
capital gain).
32. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 102, 95 Stat. 186 (1981).
33. I.R.C. § 1202.
34. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 121 95 Stat. 176 (1981),
amending I.R.C. § 1.
the incentive for the higher bracket taxpayers to make charitable
gifts, whether in the form of cash or property. At the same time, the
new law extended the charitable deduction to non-itemizers, at least
on a temporary basis." The problems of untaxed appreciation and
imprecise valuation remain, however, and have provided the focus
for further attacks on the charitable deduction.
III. Valuation
A. Identfcation of the Problem
Obviously, if the value of a contributed art object is inflated the
possibility of profit returns, and in such an instance, the benefits are
truly unwarranted.36 The difficulties of enforcement in regard to do-
nations of art have proven particularly acute. Whenever a taxpayer
makes a gift of capital gain property to a qualified charity, the fair
market value rule governs the amount of his deduction." Absent a
recent arm's length purchase or sale of that property in a stable mar-
ket,38 determining the fair market value becomes highly
35. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 121, 95 Stat. 196 (1981),
amending I.R.C. § 170. By its terms, the new charitable deduction expires Dec. 31, 1986. The
deduction is phased into operation as follows:
Year Maximum Deductible Amount
1982, 1983 25% of $100
1984 25% of $300
1985 50% of all contributions
1986 100% of all contributions
Id § 121(2) & (3).
36. If a hypothetical 50% bracket taxpayer sells a painting having no basis but with a fair
market value of $100, he would net $80. Yet if he valued the painting at $200 and gave it to
charity, he would realize $100 in tax savings. By over-valuing the gift the taxpayer obtains a
$20 profit, rather than incurring a $30 loss. He has thus received an unwarranted benefit of
$50.
Professor Speiller has computed the profits accruing to a 5017o and 70% bracket taxpayers
(pre-1981 rates), including a 20% sales commission in the calculations. Speiller, supra note 8,
at 222 (Table 1).
37. "Fair market value depends upon value in the market and not on intrinsic worth."
Rev. Proc. 66-49, 1966-2 C.B. 1257. With the exception of silver and gold objects, a work of
art has virtually no intrinsic worth. Hildesley, Appraisals in the Fine Arts, 114 TRUSTS & Es-
TATES 254, 255 (1975). See note 26 and accompanying text supra. See also note 46 infira
38. Cost or actual selling price within a reasonable time before or after the valuation date
may be the best evidence of fair market value. Rev. Proc. 66-49, 1966-2 C.B. 1257. See also
Determining the Value of Donated Property, IRS Publication No. 561, at I (rev. Nov. 1980).
In the context of the art market, see Tripp v. Commissioner, 22 T.C.M. (CCH) 1225
(1963), aj7'd, 337 F.2d 432 (7th Cir. 1964), in which the court stated, "Where sales of the
property to be valued have been made at or about a crucial date, they are preferred as evidence
of value rather than [expert] opinion." 1d at 1231 (citations omitted). But see Silverman v.
Commissioner, 27 T.C.M. (CCH) 1066 (1968): "Cost figures alone, however, do not establish
fair market value. But they are a significant starting point, to which relevant adjustments may
be made." Id at 1074. It should be noted, however, that the court in Trpp also considered the
fact that the price paid by the donor was approximately the same as that at which the dealer
had acquired the jewelry four years earlier, that the pieces had been insured for the sale price
while on loan to the museum prior to the gift, and that there was no evidence of developments
that would have caused an increase in value in the period between the sale and the gift. Tripp
v. Commissioner, 22 T.C.M. (CCH) 1225, 1229 & 1231 (1963). For a discussion of the volatile
nature of the art market see notes 61-69 and accompanying text infra.
problematical.
The guidelines set forth by the IRS describe several methods
customarily utilized to establish the value of property.39 Appraisals
of real estate, for example, rely upon comparable sales,4" capitaliza-
tion of income,4' or replacement cost minus observed depreciation.42
The income method is generally considered inapplicable to works of
art, although conceivably art objects could generate income. Re-
placement cost is similarly inappropriate given the intrinsic unique-
ness of art. The remaining measure, comparable sales, provides
some assistance, but the originality of artistic and cultural objects, as
well as the subjectivity inherent in aesthetic judgments belie the no-
tion that comparability is an adequate test.4 3 Recent sales of the art-
ist's oeuvre,4 or of works by an artist of a similar style and period,45
are looked to for guidance-if they exist-but individual variations
in quality,' size,47 subject matter,48 historical association,49 condi-
39. Rev. Proc. 66-49, 1966-2 C.B. 1257.
40. The comparable sales method compares the donated property with similar properties
that have been sold, taking into account differences in date of sale, size, condition, location and
any other factors affecting value. Determining the Value of Donated Property, IRS Publication
561, at 9 (rev. Nov. 1980).
41. This method capitalizes the net income from the property at a rate that represents a
fair return on the particular investment at the particular time, considering the risks involved.
Id at 10.
42. The replacement cost of a building is calculated by using the number of square feet
or cubic feet in the building. The final cost figure represents the total cost of labor and materi-
als, overhead and profit. The figure is then reduced to account for physical deterioration,
functional obsolescence and economic obsolescence. Generally, this method sets an upper
limit of value, because the reasonable and informed buyer will not pay more for the property
than it would cost to reproduce a similar property. Id
43. Because of the inherent difficulty of the valuation issue, some courts have expressed
the view that the question is more appropriately resolved by the settlement process than by
adjudication. Farber v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 673, 674 (1974).
In reality, every gift of non-fungible property presents the problem of uniqueness. Land,
for example, has historically been designated as unique in the context of equity actions. For
purposes of valuation, then, the question is really a matter of the degree to which society has
become accustomed to and has developed means for translating the value of the property into
a dollar figure. At some point in time, art objects may be seen as readily capable of evaluation,
just as dollar values are currently placed on real estate as a matter of course.
44. The sale of similar work by the same artist may not be "comparable" at all in terms
of quality. "Masters do not always do masterpieces." Vogel, Fine Art Investments in TAX
CONSEQUENCES OF INVESTMENTS 125, 151 (M. Ginsburg, ed. 1969). See Cukor v. Commis-
sioner, 27 T.C.M. (CCH) 89 (1968).
When the valuation of an object turns upon its authenticity, the courts have generally
declined to decide that issue. Instead, they treat the fact that authenticity is in doubt as a
depressant on value, to the extent that the uncertainty was either known or reasonably should
have been known on the date of transfer. Peters v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 552, 553
(1977); Farber v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 673, 676 (1974): Mathias v. Commissioner,
50 T.C. 994, 998-99 (1978). But cf. Vanderhook v. Commissioners, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1394
(1977).
The Mathias court compared the process of downward adjustment to cases in which it is
necessary to value a patent or a claim whose validity is in doubt. 50 T.C. at 998.
45. See Dawson v. Malina, 463 F. Supp. 461, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (breach of warranty
action).
46. Quality generally refers to the aesthetic impression of the object, as distinguished
from historical value or literary associations, but in recent years scholars and curators have
recognized that these attributes may be inseparable from the totality of the work.
tion,50 provenence,5 and rarity52 may be determinative.53 Truly,
"an object has a compound of values."54 Even prints, or other multi-
pies, cannot necessarily be equated with works in the same edition."
Is the notion of the masterpiece or the notion of quality so totally dependent on the
visual? Have we not. . . become increasingly interested in content, in historical val-
ues, literary values, cultural values, in meaning in general. And that has changed our
whole perception of quality. Quality is no longer confined to the. . . notion of great
beauty and style. For me, it is no longer a formalist notion.
On Being a Print Curator. Eight Views, I I THE PRINT COLLECTOR'S NEWSLETTER 73, 78
(1980) (quoting Richard Field, Curator of Prints, Drawings and Photographs at the Yale Uni-
versity Art Gallery). In reality, however, the concept of quality may be undefinable. Id at 78.
(Harold Joachim, Curator of Prints and Drawings, Art Institute of Chicago).
47. Cukor v. Commissioner, 27 T.C.M. (CCH) 89, 95 (1968). Obviously, monumental
sculptures and paintings are of little utility to the apartment dweller. In such a case, the insti-
tutional or corporate market must be considered. C. GOODMAN, ART MARKETING HAND-
BOOK, 160-61 (1978).
48. For example, "[a]n artist whose images reflect an angry point of view may have
trouble finding clients who are impressed enough to share the artist's anguish." Id at 161.
49. See Mathias v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 994, 996 (1968) (identity of subject of portrait
is an element in determining its value).
When historical associations are a major factor in determining the value of an object the
market value may fluctuate greatly from place to place. For example, photographs or prints
depicting Philadelphia imagery would be highly desirable in the Philadelphia market, but
have little or no value in North Carolina, unless the works could stand on their own artistic
merits.
50. C. GOODMAN, supra note 47, at 288. Of course, the ravages of time will assail even
the most technically sound works of art. The degree to which a work has been restored, as well
as the quality of that restoration, will affect its value.
51. Provenance refers to the history of ownership and exhibition of the object. Peters v.
Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 552, 553 (1977). Provenance not only supports the authen-
ticity of the work, id, Mathias v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 994, 999 (1968) (provenance of tax-
payer's painting by Gilbert Stuart differed from that of painting listed in authoritative
compilation of Stuart's work), but it also enhances the value if the work was at one time part of
an important collection or if it appeared in a major exhibition. See Crocker Nat'l Bank v.
United States, 39 A.F.T.R. 2d (P-H) 77-779 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
52. Works by masters of earlier generations become scarcer and dearer with time, partic-
ularly as acquisitions by museums and by other public institutions reduce the pool of master-
pieces available to the private marketplace. C. GOODMAN, supra note 47, at 281. See also
Furstenberg v. United States, 595 F.2d 603, 606 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
53. See generaly Hildesley, Appraisals in the Fine Arts, 115 TR. & EST. 254 (1975).
54. PRINT COLLECTOR'S NEWSLETTER, supra note 46, at 78 (Henri Zerner, Curator of
Prints, Fogg Art Museum, and Professor of Fine Arts at Harvard).
55. Although the printmaking technique allows many copies of a single image to be
made, it is usually only the earliest impressions, taken before the plate or block begins to wear,
that reveal the artist's true intent. The first few "pulls", therefore, are usually the most valua-
ble. In some cases, however, the artist may have made improvements to the plate after the first
trial impressions, in which case the second or third state may be the most highly prized. KEEN,
THE SALE OF WORKS OF ART: A STUDY BASED ON THE TIMES SOTHEBY INDEX 141 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as TIMES-SOTHEBY INDEX].
In addition, because multiple impressions of the same print are available, condition be-
comes an even more critical indicator of value. "The print that was perhaps the finest impres-
sion known of such and such a print by Lucas van Leyden or Rembrandt, if something
happens and there is a nick in the corner or a tear, it is no longer the finest." If a nick is made
in a Raphael drawing, "it's still the same Raphael drawing. It's unique and its value probably
would not be diminished." PRINT COLLECTOR'S NEWSLETTER supra note 46, at 80 (Harold
Joachim, Curator of Prints and Drawings, Art Institute of Chicago).
Impression, state, and condition are less important when few examples of the particular
print - or of that artist's work in general - have survived. TIMES-SOTHEBY INDEX at 153.
Paradoxically, prints by some of the most distinguished and successful artists of their day,
Durer, Rembrandt and Claude, for example, may be relatively less expensive because so many
more of them are available. Prints by those masters are certainly more easily obtained than
their original paintings or drawings. Id at 141-143 & 138-164.
Extrinsic variables also affect the value of a work of art. The
vagaries of the market place56 must be taken into account, since ulti-
mately it is the market price and not "beauty" that determines the
allowable deduction. 7 Traditionally, the art market consisted of
two outlets: the auction house and the dealer's gallery. Auction
sales of other types of property are generally considered poor indica-
tors of value,5" but the tax court has recently acknowledged the
unique role of auctions in the art world.59 Accordingly, any discus-
sion of valuation must take cognizance of auctions:
Auctions form the visible vertibrae of the art market. Auctions
provide the only public records of sales, and only auctions provide
open, competitive bidding on a particular painting. ... The mu-
seums make their insurance evaluations from auction cata-
logues. The dealers move prices up and down and serious
collectors learn the value of their works according to sales at auc-
tion. Auctions establish prices.6'
But the establishment of fair market value is not accomplished
simply by tracking auction sales and making allowance for dealer
mark-up. The business of art is a much more complex-and cha-
otic-system. Although art dealers participate in auctions,62 auction
prices are not necessarily wholesale prices because a dealer may be
bidding on behalf of a client. Collectors themselves often buy at
auction rather than exclusively through a gallery, as had been the
practice in the early part of this century.63 Furthermore, the art auc-
tion is hardly the perfect paradigm of the open marketplace. Secret
56. Market price may reflect the reputation of the artist or even the influence of the art
dealer, if he is known for his knowledge and leadership in promoting certain schools of art.
Thus, the "pedigree" of a work may be a significant factor in determining market price, quite
apart from the intrinsic quality of the work or its technical merit. As in other fields, what is
fashionable may, at times, be equated with what is valuable. C. GOODMAN, supra note 47, at
307.
57. "We have had agents tell us how ugly some paintings were - 'disgusting' I think was
the word. Nevertheless, we assured them that it was the fair market value that counted."
Vogel, supra note 44, at 150.
58. The courts generally equate auctions with distress or forced sales that generate only a
fraction of the return that might have been realized had the items been sold on an individual
basis. See Daniel S. McGuire, 44 T.C. 801 (1965).
59. Estate of David Smith, 57 T.C. 650, 658 (1974), afl'd on another issue, 570 F.2d 479
(2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 827 (1975); Farber v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH)
673, 675 (1974); Mathias v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 994, 999 (1968).
Prior to World War II, 90% of the art business in New York was transacted through
dealers. Auction sales have experienced phenomenal growth in recent years, and in the 1970's
were estimated as accounting for nearly 50% of all art transactions. S. BURNHAM, THE ART
CROWD 53 (1973); L. DUBOFF, THE DEsKBOOK OF ART LAW 542 (1977). See generaly id at
536-71.
60. Insurance valuations are sometimes considered as probative evidence of value. See
Tripp v. Commissioner, 22 T.C.M. (CCH) 1225, 1229 (1963); Farber v. Commissioner, 33
T.C.M. (CCH) 673, 674 (1974).
61. S. BURNHAM, supra note 59, at 53 (1973).
62. Professor Speiller reports that dealers account for 60% of the sales at Sotheby Parke-
Bernet auctions. Speiller, supra note 8, at 229.
63. C. GOODMAN, supra note 47, at 5; S. BURNHAM, supra note 59, at 52.
bids,64 reserves,65 and "auction fever" distort the sales process and
the participants do not all stand on equal footing or possess "reason-
able knowledge of the relevant facts."
66
In addition to the established auction and dealer markets, the
channels of commerce in art have become more decentralized in re-
cent years, and regional submarkets have developed. New York,
while still the largest market, is no longer the only outlet for art.
Serious art collectors and reputable galleries may now be found in
every section of the country.67 Capitalizing on this trend, a few ma-
jor art dealers have organized chains of galleries in key cities or have
created what amounts to franchise relationships with selected in-
dependent dealers in other market areas. With the rise of the print
industry, workshops and publishers have entered the art market, dis-
tributing multiple editions to retail dealers across the country or di-
rectly to individual and institutional collectors through private
subscription organizations. Finally, artists cooperatives have joined
in the distribution process.68 All of this activity, although indicative
of the lusty health of the American art market, has further compli-
cated finding a satisfactory answer to the question of what price in
what market can be legitimately tagged as "fair market value.
'69
The complexity of setting a realistic fair market value invites
abuse in and of itself, but the temptations are increased by the inter-
action among dealers, collectors, critics and museums. Museum cu-
rators attempt to curry the favor of donors who possess substantial
collections;7" dealers perform appraisals for collectors whom they
64. In contrast to oral bids, a bidder may convey his offer by a writing, a handshake, a
whisper, or some pre-arranged signal. The auctioneer then compares bids without disclosing
them. L. DuBOFF, supra note 59, at 541.
65. A seller may set a minimum price, or reserve, that must be bid before the item may
be sold. Id at 546-47. Under U.C.C.§ 2-328(2), all sales are subject to reserve prices unless
the auction is designated in explicit terms as without reserve.
66. See note 17 supra
67. C. GOODMAN, supra note 47, at 6, 22-24, 31-36.
68. Id at 4-10.
69. Undoubtedly, the difficulties of valuation added ammunition to the attack on the fair
market value deduction for ordinary income property, see notes 23-24 and accompanying text
supra, since proper valuation methods for contemporary works seemed particularly elusive.
The thought may have been that time will serve as a test for the value of a work by a dead
artist, but the living could take advantage of the absence of adequate benchmarks to "paint
themselves a deduction," particularly if no established market exists for the artist's work. See
Statement of Libby Newman, National Vice-President Artists Equity Association, 1973 Hear-
ings, supra note 7, at 6115; Statement of John Hightower, President, Associated Councils of the
Arts, 1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 6115. Gifts of contemporary art donated by a collector, in
contrast, have the advantage of at least one indicator of fair market value - the purchase price.
Although donations of capital gain property were not restricted to cost by the Tax Reform Act
of 1969, retention of the fair market value standard by no means precluded a finding that the
best indicator of fair market value was indeed the sale price to the collector. See note 38 supra
and discussion of Rev. Rul. 80-69, 1980-11 I.R.B. 5 (1980) and Rev. Rul. 80-233, 1980-35
I.R.B. 6 (1980) in text accompanying notes 129-132 infra But see notes 272-273 and accompa-
nying text infra.
70. Professor Speiler's interviews with museum officials indicate that even the most pres-
tigious institutions occasionally accept inferior works in order to please important donors. For
may serve as clients and place values on works by artists whose work
they may sell;71 and critics provide contemporaneous indicators of
the quality of works sold, donated, and exhibited.72 This interdepen-
dence of roles has led to charges of cooperation in obtaining the
highest possible valuations, if not outright collusion in procuring and
accepting works with inflated values.
7 3
smaller museums, particularly university museums, the experience is more frequent. Speiller,
supra, note 8, at 232.
The scenerio is a familiar one to any curator: the new donor who offers the least valuable
item in his collection with the implication that its acceptance will insure future contributions of
more important works, or the "collection" of prints or historical objects comprised of generally
inferior or even worthless items and one or two objects of considerable historical or artistic
significance. See PRINT COLLECTOR'S NEWSLETrER supra note 46, at 82-83.
71. Members of the Art Dealer's Association of America are prohibited by the Associa-
tion's rules from giving individual appraisals for income tax purposes, but they may recom-
mend to their clients the appraisal service of the Association in an attempt to provide
independent, disinterested, and expert evaluations. See Speiller, supra note 8, at 230-31.
72. From Sophy Burnham's very cynical viewpoint, the interaction of dealers, critics,
collectors and museum officials produces a closed and self-serving society.
The business of the dealer is to sell art. He must find and promote artists whose
works will sell. . . .The function of the critic is to praise those artists he believes in.
He never "betrays his convictions," but in some cases he pushes artists with whom he
associates, sleeps, and whose work he collects.
The function of the collector is to collect. . . .He reads art criticism and is de-
lighted to see a picture in Art News which the dealer may have paid for.
The collector is a trustee of the museum. He makes museum policy, and when
he dies he bequeathes his collection to a museum, receiving a tax deduction in return.
The collection becomes immortalized as Art.
S. BURNHAM, THE ART CROWD 161 (1973).
73. Professor Speiller comments that "any given art object can have a wide range of
possible prices, so even the most reputable dealers can be expected to appraise at the top of the
range." Speiller, supra note 8, at 230. This conclusion is hardly a valid ground for objection,
however, as long as the dealer is knowledgeable about the artist or period in question and has
a realistic basis in fact for his opinion. Compare Tripp v. Commissioner, 357 F.2d 432, 434 (2d
Cir. 1964), affirming, 22 T.C.M. (CCH) 1225 (1963); VanderHook v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1394, 1396 (1977); Rupke v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.M. (CCH), 1098, 1100 (1973); Weil
v. Commissioner, 26 T.C.M. (CCH) 388, 390 (1967) with Crocker Nat'l Bank v. United States,
39 A.F.T.R. 2d (P-H) 77-779, 77-780 (C.D. Cal. 1976); Gordon v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1227, 1228 (1976).
More disturbing are those cases in which the dealer or experts are obviously accommodat-
ing the wishes of the client. See VanderHook v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1394, 1396
(1977); Silverman v. Commissioner, 27 T.C.M. (CCH) 1066, 1073 (1968). Most unfortunate of
all are museum officials who either look the other way when exaggerated valuations are made
known to them, or who actively encourage or participate in the plan to obtain an unwarranted
tax benefit. See Tripp v. Commissioner, 22 T.C.M. (CCH) 1225, 1227 (1963); J. HEss, THE
GRAND ACQUISITORs 44 (1974). But see notes 136-144 and accompanying text infra (changing
attitudes in the profession regarding responsibility for tax abuse).
Knowingly giving a false appraisal to be used by the donor who claims a charitable de-
duction constitutes a felony under § 7206(2) of the Internal Revenue Code. See United States
v. Wolfson, 573 F.2d 216, 224-25 (5th Cir. 1978) (actual preparation and signing not necessary
for prosecution).
The statute addresses itself to any person who
... Willfully aids or assists in, or procures, counsels, or advises the preparation or
presentation under, or in connection with any matter arising under, the internal reve-
nue laws, of a return, affidavit, claim, or other document, which is a fraudulent return
or is false as to any material matter, whether or not such falsity or fraud is with the
knowledge or consent of the person authorized or required to present such return,
affidavit, claim, or document. ...
I.R.C. § 7206(2). Section 7206(2) could conceivably be applied to dealers and curators, but as
a practical matter - given the subjectivity of valuation - their conduct would have to be most
blatant to invoke criminal prosecution.
Not surprisingly, the dramatic growth of interest in art and in
collecting74 has exacerbated the problems of enforcement. Although
the acquisitive nature of collecting implies a concern with the pecu-
niary rewards of buying and selling art objects, pleasure and profit
are often inextricably intertwined.7 5 For the true collector, financial
remuneration may be merely an inevitable by-product of what the
historian and archaeologist Igor Noel-Hume has characterized as the
"sporting spirit" of the collector.76 Nevertheless, in this decade, col-
lectors, dealers, and connoisseurs all acknowledge that economic
concerns have provided a very real motivating force behind the cur-
rent collecting boom. Statistics clearly indicate that tangible assets
present a hedge against inflation unavailable through more tradi-
tional forms of financial assets.77 Moreover, the collecting fervor has
crossed social and economic class lines to infect anyone with the lei-
sure time and excess disposable income to invest in beating the infla-
tionary foe.78
Astute collectors have recognized the potential for tax savings
through contributing art to museums. As more taxpayers discover
the benefit of the deduction, and as the fields of collecting activity
74. Both Christie's and Sotheby Parke-Bernet reported record sales for the 1979-80 sea-
son - more than $100 million and $200 million respectively. Mellow, The Auction Boom.-
What PriceArt, SAT. REV. (July 1980) at 26, 26-27. According to the Times-Sotheby Index,
supra note 55, at 24, art prices have multiplied at least 10 times since the 1950's.
75. The noted art dealer Sidney Janis once commented, "scratch a collector and you will
find a dealer." S. BURNHAM, THE ART CROWD 80 (1973). Geraldine Keen, in chronicling the
growth of the post-World War II art market, has identified two outstanding characteristics of
the modern "consumer" of art:
The two most important aspects of this attitude [toward art] can be roughly termed
the religious and the financial. On the one hand, there has been a growing feeling
that art is a great good in its own right, a civilizing influence, a matter for deep study
and deep appreciation verging on worship. On the other, there has been a wide-
spread realization of the investment potential of art and its advantages in an infla-
tionary period as a hedge against the dangers inherent in paper currencies.
TIMES-SOTHEBY INDEX, supra note 55, at 26. See also Christiansen, Neumann.- How the Hell
Did I Collect It .411 79 ARTNEWS 90, 93 (1980); Trucco, The World Art Market Conference:
Optimism Prevails, 79 ARTNEWS 102, 104 (1980).
The question of whether profit or pleasure motives predominate may be significant in
another context. If the taxpayer wishes to deduct his expenses and losses resulting from the
acquisition and care of his collection, he must show that he is an investor and that his costs
were incurred "for the production of income" or "for the maintenance of property held for the
production of income." I.R.C. § 212. For a classic example of the difficulty of determining the
primary motive, see Wrightsman v. United States, 428 F.2d 1316 (Ct. Cl. 1970). A more in-
depth discussion of the problem is found in Speiller, supra note 8, at 253-259.
76. I. NOEL-HUME, ALL THE BEST RUBBISH 17 (1974).
77. In 1979, the Consumer Price Index rose 14.5%. The rate of return for old master
paintings stood at 17.4%, for stamps at 43.2%, and for coins at 25.3%. In contrast, stocks
gained only 12.5%, and bonds actually declined by 3.1%. O'Donnell, Stocks? Or Collectibles,
126 FORBES 70 (1980). Behind these cold facts and figures is the more subjective sense of
security afforded by tangible investments in a risky economy: "In times of crisis, great art is an
immediately recognizable and negotiable form of wealth." Mellow, The Auction Boom.- What
Price Art? SAT. REV., July 1980 at 26-29 (quoting New York Times critic John Russell).
78. See Norton, Art Collecting. Avocation or Aberration, 66 A.B.A.J. 1393 (1980);
TIMES-SOTHEBY INDEX, supra note 55, at 25. The inflationary effect of this activity is dis-
cussed at note 238 infra.
diversify,79 policing the deduction has become more difficult. As
long as the taxpayer's claimed valuation is kept within legal bounds,
however, it is inappropriate to think of the deduction for gifts of art
as a tax "loophole." Such a pejorative characterization ignores the
fact that Congress made a considered policy decision to allow such
tax treatment, and implies that the government possesses a prior
claim to an individual's income.8 0 Only when the deduction is
abused through overvaluation does a tax loophole exist.
B. Combatting the Problem
1. The Related Use Provision. -The limited case law concern-
ing art valuation indicates that the pattern of abuse in the 1960's and
early 1970's generally took the form of individual gifts of inferior
works at inflated values to smaller art institutions, universities, and
hospitals."' In many instances, the so-called "philanthropists" were
actually dumping unwanted objects on charitable organizations that
would subsequently sell the objects at auction or "tent" sales for
prices considerably below the taxpayer's claimed deduction. 82 Be-
cause of the distress nature of such sales, the government was unable
to prove that such deductions were unwarranted. 3 The "related
use" restriction, inaugurated by the 1969 Tax Reform Act," was
designed to address the dumping problem. If the gift of tangible per-
sonal property is not used to further the charity's tax-exempt pur-
pose, that is, if the use is not "related," the taxpayer must reduce his
deduction by 40% of the appreciated value of the object.8 5 Despite
79. Collecting interests have diversified from the more traditional "fine arts" of painting
and sculpture into decorative arts, folk arts, ceramics, graphics and memorbilia. Norton, supra
note 78, at 1394; Schonfeld, Investing in Art, AMERICAN ARTIST, Feb. 1980 at 18.
80. Hochman & Rogers, The Optimal Tax Treatment of Charitable Contributions, 30
NAT'L TAX J. 1, 15 n.2 (1977). See IV. B. infra
81. Speiller, supra note 8, at 232 and n.69; PRINT COLLECTOR'S NEWSLETTER, supra note
46, at 83.
82. But see Statement of Frank L. Gofflo, Executive Director of CARE, 1973 Hearings,
supra note 7, at 6165, 6166 (only accepts property useful in CARE relief programs).
83. See Silverman v. Commissioner, 27 T.C.M. (CCH) 1066 (1968); Daniel S. McGuire,
44 T.C. 801 (1965).
84. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 201(a)(l)(B), 83 Stat. 549 (codified at
I.R.C. § 170(c)(1)(B)(i)) provides,
The amount of any charitable contribution of property. . . shall be reduced by the
sum of -
(A) the amount of gain which would not have been long-term
capital gain if the property contributed had been sold
I . . at its fair market value ... and
(B) in the case of a charitable contribution -
(i) of tangible personal property, if the use by the donee is unrelated to
the purpose or function constituting the basis for its exemption under sec-
tion 501...
40 per cent ... of the amount of the gain which would have been long-term capital gain...
85. Id The reduction of the amount of the charitable deduction by 40% of the appreci-
ated value corresponds to the amount that would have been taxable had the taxpayer sold the
asset and realized capital gain. Only 40% of capital gain is included in the taxpayer's adjusted
the fact that the acquisition of art is one of the tax-exempt functions
of a museum,86 the Internal Revenue Service designated the sale or
exchange of donated art object by a museum to obtain more impor-
tant or more appropriate items for the collection as an unrelated
use."7 In light of the rulings that gifts of art to educational organiza-
tions for "study purposes" and for exhibits to facilitate "art apprecia-
gross income. See I.R.C. §1202. That this conformity with the capital gains tax rate was
intended is obvious from the fact that the reduction was changed from 50% to 40% at the same
time that the capital gains rate was similarly decreased. Compare Revenue Act of 1978, Pub.
L. 95-600, § 402(b)(2), 92 Stat. 2867 with id §§ 402(c)(1).
Since the target of the related use restriction is clearly appreciated tangible personal prop-
erty that the charity is expected to sell rather than retain, the provision treats the gift as akin to
a "constructive sale" by the donor. If the taxpayer had realized $100 in capital gains from a
sale of a painting, only $40 of that amount would have been taxable. At the highest rate of
50%, he would pay $20 in taxes. If, however, be makes an unrelated use donation of a painting
with a fair market value of $100, his deduction would be limited to $60 (assuming a basis of
zero) for a $30 tax savings (50% of $60). The "lost" tax savings, therefore, would equal $20,
that is, the difference between $50 in tax savings if the gift had been fully deductible and the
$30 as a result of the related use reduction.
This "constructive sale" treatment is analogous in theory to the "constructive redemption"
theory propounded by the IRS in attempts to invalidate gifts of stock in closely-held corpora-
tions when the corporation is under the donor's control and subsequently redeems or repur-
chases its stock from the charity. The Service argued that such a transaction masked a
redemption of stock from the donor "essentially equivalent to a dividend" under I.R.C.
§ 302(b)(1), taxable to the donor, followed by a charitable contribution of the proceeds. See
Palmer v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 684, 691 (1974), afl'don another issue, 523 F.2d 1308 (8th
Cir. 1975). The courts, however, almost uniformly recognized the validity of the gifts and
declined to characterize the transfers as sham transactions in the absence of a specific obliga-
tion or agreement to have the shares redeemed, despite the fact that the charity almost always
must sell the stock in order to obtain the benefit of the gift. See, e.g., Wekesser v. Commis-
sioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 940 (1976) (church initiated repurchase transaction because no mar-
ket existed for stock). Indeed, the courts seemed to bend over backwards in order to allow the
deductions, see Palmer v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 684 (1974) (donor was controlling trustee of
charity and redemption occurred one day after gift), apparently out of a desire to encourage
charitable contributions. See Grove v. Commissioner, 490 F.2d 241 (2d Cir: 1973) (educa-
tional institutions must utilize attractive gift plans to obtain sufficient funding); Behrend v.
United States, 73-1 U.S. TAx CAs. (CCH) 9123 (4th Cir. 1972) (donor controlled both char-
ity and corporation, but the court found that no benefit inured to the taxpayer other than the
tax advantage). Thus, the attitude that the courts have taken in this analogous area is in con-
siderable contrast to that taken by Congress in enacting the related use provision. Perhaps the
inconsistency can be attributed to a belief that valuation of close-corporation stock is more
easily achieved than valuation of tangible personal property. See note 89 infra
In 1978, the IRS acquiesced in a decision upholding a gift redemption transaction, with
the qualification that it would treat the gift as a redemption, taxable to the donor, "if the donee
is legally bound or can be compelled by the corporation to surrender the shares for redemp-
tion." Rev. Rul. 78-197, 1978-1 C.B. 83, acq. in Palmer v. Commissioner 62 T.C. 684 (1974),
af'd on another issue, 523 F.2d 1308 (8th Cir. 1975).
86. It is generally recognized that museums fulfill three main functions. First, they serve
as depositories devoted to the preservation and conservation of objects of cultural, historical,
aesthetic, or educational value. Second, they are centers of research, that is, they promote
scholarship by utilizing and focusing on the objects in their collections. Last, they operate as
educational agencies, both through affirmative teaching programs, e.g., tours, lectures, and
through the passive mechanism of allowing public access to the objects themselves. See A.S.
WrrrLIN, MUSEUMS: IN SEARCH OF A USABLE FuTuRE 1 (1970); Kyros, Our Own BestAdvo-
cates, MUSEUM NEWS, July/Aug. 1981, at 20 (hereinafter cited as Advocates).
It is in its first role as a depository that the museum is charged with the duty of acquiring
art. For a further discussion of the role of museums, see notes 224-227 and accompanying text
inira.
87. Treas. Reg. 1.170A-4(b)(3)(i) (1972). See also Letter Rul. 7751044 (Sept. 22, 1977)
(use by museum for display or in lending collection is related).
tion"88 are deductible in full as related use donations, the application
of the no-sale limitation to museums seems particularly misguided.
89
A limited measure of relief was afforded, however, by the subse-
quent inclusion of the following presumption in the regulations:
In the case of a contribution of tangible personal property to or for
the use of a museum, if the object donated is of a general type
normally retained by such museum or other museums for museum
purposes, it will be reasonable for the donor to anticipate, 
unless
e has actual knowledge to the contrary, that the object will not be
put to an unrelated use by the donee, whether or not the object is
later sold or exchanged by the donee.
90
This provision thus permits some exercise of discretion by the muse-
ums without endangering the tax status of their donors.
2 The Art Advisory Panel -Probably the most significant en-
forcement measure taken by the IRS was the formation in 1968 of
the Art Advisory Panel.9' Consisting of art experts, museum profes-
sionals, artists, and dealers,
92 the Panel advises the Service on valua-
tions of works of art donated to charity. Commentators have
differed in regard to the impact of the Panel,
93 but as a practical
matter, its effectiveness is limited in that only valuations in excess of
$20,000 are referred to it for review.
94 Professor Speiller points out
88. Letter Rul. 7911109 (Dec. 18, 1978) (display of lithographs at schools as part 
of ex-
hibits to further art appreciation of students and the general public); Letter 
Rul. 7751044 (Sept.
22, 1977) (display of lithographs at children's camp in connection with 
arts and crafts
program).
89. Robert Anthoine reports that the related use provision has enjoyed "benign 
neglect."
Anthoine, Deductions for Charitable Contributions of Appreciated Property - The 
Art World,
35 TAx. L. REV. 239, 251-52 (1980).
The no-sale rule for tangible personal property is inconsistent with the fact that 
donations
of real estate and securities, which are generally sold by charitable donees in order 
to realize
the benefit of the gift, are not subject to the related use test. This result obviously 
reflects the
belief that more precise and reliable indicators of value exist for such property. 
But see note 43
.sspra,
90. Treas. Reg. § 1. 170A-4(b)(3)(ii)(b).
91. See IRS News Release [1968] 7 STAND. FED. TAX. REP. (CCH) 1 6573 (Feb. 1, 1968).
See also 42 Fed. Reg. 31, 862 (June 15, 1977) (determination of necessity for reestablishment).
92. The following individuals are the current members of the Art Advisory Panel: Harry
Brooks, President, Wildenstein & Co., N.Y., N.Y.; Ann d'Harnoncourt, Curator, Twentieth
Century Painting, Philadelphia Museum of Art; Charles Moffett, Curator Nineteenth 
Century
Painting, New York Metropolitan Museum of Art, Gerald Stiebel, Rosenburg & Stiebel, 
N.Y.,
N.Y.; John Walsh, Curator of Painting, Boston Museum of Fine Arts; John Wilmerding, 
Cura-
tor, American Painting, National Gallery of Art, Washington, D.C. Informal Publication, Art
Valuation Group, Internal Revenue Service (Oct. 9, 1981).
93. Compare 122 CONG,. REC. 23, 359-60 (1976) (statement of Sen. Javits) (valuation no
longer a problem) with O'Connell, Defending Art Valuation for Tax Purposes, 115 
TRUSTS &
ESTATES 604, 605 (1976) (instrumental in halting over valuations primarily when authenticity
in question and Speiller, supra note 8, at 236 & n.87 (critical of Panel's overall effectiveness).
94. See II Internal Revenue Manual - Audit (CCH) at IV. § 42(16) 4.2 (1981). Items
under $20,000 generally are handled by the district offices, although questionable returns
under that amount may be referred to the National Office. Only gifts over $20,000 are required
to be submitted for Panel review. Id Because of the volume of items, the Panel does 
not
review every claim over $20,000, but only those selected by the Art Valuation Group of 
the
National Office. See Speiller, supra note 8, at 235 n.82.
that a great number of deductions for contributions of art objects are
never scrutinized at all, regardless of the claimed amount, because
only a small fraction of tax returns in each income class are selected
for audit." Of course, a limited audit procedure reduces the surveil-
lance and detection rate for any abusive practice. Nevertheless, over
valuations appeared in nearly half of the gifts reviewed by the Panel
in recent years.
96
The weight that the Panel's recommendation carries in litigation
is uncertain at present.97 Among the cases in which the Service has
presented the panel's report as opinion evidence, one decision ac-
cepted the Panel's findings,9 one ruled in favor of the taxpayer99 and
one set a figure somewhere in between.' In the latter case, the
court fixed the value of the painting, but neglected to report the rea-
sons for its conclusion.' 0 ' Given the limited scope of the Panel's ac-
tivity and the nature of the court as an independent factfinder,' 02 the
major consequence of the Panel under current procedures is an in
terrorem effect.
The increased popularity of print collecting, the special difficul-
ties of determining their value,' 0 3 and the amenability of art print
publishing ventures to tax shelter programs, I0I have led to particular
enforcement problems for donations of prints. As a result, last year
95. Speiller, supra note 8, at 234.
96. Id at 238-39 (based on a Freedom of Information Act Request for Panel records).
See also [1978] COMM'R OF INTERNAL REVENUE ANN. REP. 43.
97. The Panel's findings are advisory only, II Internal Revenue Manual, supra note 94, at
§ 42(16) 4.1, but in most cases the Service follows their recommendations. Cf. Posner v.
Comm'r, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 943, 947 (1976) (expert for Commissioner explains discrepancy
between his appraisal and valuation by Panel).
98. Id Faced with conflicting valuations of $1,500 by the Commissioner's expert and
$15,000 by the taxpayer's appraiser, the court in Posner was "unable to find as a fact that the
value . . exceeded $5,000" precisely the figure previously set by the Art Advisory Panel. Id
99. Crocker Nat'l Bank v. United States, 39 A.F.T.R. 2d (P-H) 77-779 (C.D. Cal. 1976)
(IRS valuations based on Art Advisory Panel's recommendation held "unreasonable and
erroneous").
100. See Furstenberg v. United States, 595 F.2d 603 (Ct. Cl. 1979), in which plaintiff's
value was $250,000 while the Service allowed only $85,000.
101. The court held that $125,000 was the fair market value. Id
102. The Commissioner's findings are presumed correct and the taxpayer has the burden
of rebutting that assumption; but once the petitioner makes out a prima facie case substantiat-
ing his valuation, the government must then move to present evidence of value. Kuderna v.
Comm'r, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 749, 750 (1965). In the past, the courts have relied heavily upon
the credibility of the expert testimony and the nature of the facts buttressing their opinions, but
they disliked making any decisions on authenticity and generally avoided doing so. See note
44 supra They also disclaimed any aesthetic judgment that might be inherent in their findings
on valuation. Rebay v. Comm'r, 22 T.C.M. (CCH) 181, 182 (1963).
One court expressed its frustration with the valuation process by complaining of its dis-
taste for "Solomon-like pronouncements." Farber v. Comm'r, 33 T.C.M: (CCH) 673, 674
(1974). Because of this general dissatisfaction with the involvement of the courts in valuation
disputes, see also note 43 supra (settlement process more conducive to proper disposition of
valuation questions), the courts might find themselves almost subconsciously favoring findings
submitted by the Art Advisory Panel
103. See note 55 supra
104. See note 110 inira
the IRS announced the formation of a Print Advisory Panel, similar
in format to the Art Advisory Panel. 0 5 The Print Panel will provide
the Commissioner with information on the market value of assets in
publishing ventures, as well as the probable income from the use of
an original artistic image on posters, calendars, and other novelty
items. lO6
3. Dismantling Tax Shelter Schemes. -Although individual
taxpayers have always attempted to avoid the payment of tax
through manipulation of the Code, thus sheltering a portion of their
income, the efforts took on large-scale and more systematic propor-
tions in the mid-1970's. Tax avoidance became big business.'0 7 Pro-
moters engineered and marketed business or investment programs
designed to achieve tax savings for the high bracket taxpayer. Many
of the plans cut close to the edge of illegality. Ingenious promoters,
investors and tax practitioners inevitably discovered that the tax
shelter could be applied with equal success to investments in art.
The term "tax shelter" is often used in a general sense to refer to
any means of reducing taxes, including use of entirely legitimate tax
incentive provisions in the Code, 10 8 but its negative connotations are
more properly reserved for abusive schemes that produce unin-
tended benefits or that magnify the contemplated benefits beyond
those anticipated by Congress. 09 In the art world, the abusive shel-
105. IRS News Release (Jan. 22, 1980), reprinted in 37 BNA DAILY TAX REP. K-I (Feb.
22, 1980); see also 45 Fed. Reg. 36,576 (1980).
106. IRS News Release, supra note 105. The current Art Print Panel is composed of the
following members: John Berggruen, President, John Berggruen Gallery, San Francisco;
James Burke, Director, St. Louis Art Museum; Sylvan Cole, President and Director, Associ-
ated American Artists, N.Y., N.Y.; Dr. Richard S. Field, Acting Director, Yale Art Gallery;
Barbara Krakow, Director, Marcus Krakow Gallery, Boston; Margo Leavin, President, Margo
Leavin Gallery, Los Angeles; Richard Solomon, President, Pace Editions, Inc., N.Y.; Esther
Sparks, Curator of Prints, Art Institute of Chicago, William Struve, Director, Frumkin-Struve
Gallery, Chicago; Lawrence Munson, Munson Gallery, Sante Fe; John Stoller, Stoller Gallery,
Minneapolis, Minn. Informal Publication, Art Valuation Group, Internal Revenue Service
[Oct. 9, 1981).
107. The trend toward aggressive tax avoidance has been attributed to rampant inflation,
dollar depreciation, and heavy taxation. Federman, Gem Tax Shelters. Who Gets &urnedZ
151 JEWLERS' CIRCULAR-KEYSTONE 49, 52 (1980).
Of course, the financial planners, shelter merchandisers, and art dealers who participate in
the plans stand to realize considerable profit themselves. "Gem wholesalers can get a lot more
selling gems for tax shelter purposes than by selling the same stones to people in the trade who
know how to haggle over real-world prices." Id at 49. See also id at 52.
108. "In some cases, Congress has concluded that this loss of equity is a tolerable side
effect of a special tax provision designed to encourage particular investments." Remarks by
Jerome Kurtz, IRS Commissioner, on Abusive Tax Shelter Issues, reprinted in 55 TAxES 774
(1977) [hereinafter cited as "Remarks"]. Generally, the criticisms are not directed at those
taxpayers who take advantage of the intended benefits, and the IRS is not seeking to negate
legitimate tax benefits granted by Congress. Id at 778. One commentator has characterized
the use of tax incentives as part of the "American way." Shefsky, Take the Helter Out of
Shelter, 58 TAXES 299, 300 (1980).
109. Remarks, supra note 108, at 774. See also Ginsburg, Introduction in TAX CONSE-
QUENCES OF INVESTMENTS (1969).
Thus, legitimate tax shelters may be defined as the utilization of existing Code advan-
ters typically took two forms-the exploitation approach" 10 and the
contribution plan."' It is the latter that most concerns museums,
dealers, and artists who wish to see the charitable deduction pre-
served, because such plans have focused much unfavorable attention
on that section of the Code."1
2
tages, such as depreciation deductions, IRC §§ 167, 179 depletion allowances, IRC § 611 in-
vestment credits. IRC §§ 38 & 46, and deductions for interest payments IRC § 163 or
charitable contributions IRC § 170, to accelerate tax benefits into current periods and to defer
the tax burden into the future, or to actually reduce the tax burden itself. Shefsky, supra note
108, at 300.
Abusive shelters are those transactions or ventures that have virtually no economic (or
beneficial) purpose other than the generation of tax advantages and that employ exaggerated
valuations or otherwise mischaracterize the transaction. Id at 302 (remarks by Treasury De-
partment General Counsel, Robert Mundheim, at Securities Regulation Institute in San Di-
ego, Jan. 18, 1980).
The print tax shelter described at note 110 infra is a typical example of the abusive
venture.
110. The most common form of the exploitation scheme required the taxpayer to acquire
an original lithographic plate or stone coupled with rights to produce prints, for the purpose of
marketing both conventional limited editions and other printed products such as posters and
novelty items. The transaction was cast as a sale of the plate and printing rights rather than
the print itself because works of art have no determinable life, Rev. Rul. 68-323, 1968-1 C.B.
79, and are not depreciable. See John R. Thompson v. United States, 338 F. Supp. 770 (N.D.
Ill. 1971), afd, 447 F.2d 164 (7th Cir. 1973). The taxpayer made a relatively small cash down
payment and financed the balance with a partial recourse note due in several years. Typically,
the nonrecourse portion of the indebtedness was secured only by the print package assets
purchased and the proceeds from the sale of the prints. The plan also allowed the taxpayer in
the event of default, to satisfy his personal liability under the so-called recourse portion of the
note by turning over any of the unsold prints or products utilizing the image at a value based
on a formula linked to the last retail sales of the items. The key to the print shelter was to
inflate the total value of the package through the leveraged financing, thereby enlarging the
taxpayers depreciation deduction and tax credit but minimizing his current cash outlay. Al-
though an investor's depreciation deduction was limited to the amount for which he was per-
sonally liable, I.R.C. § 465, the 10% investment credit contained no such restriction prior to the
1981 amendments to the Code. See Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34,
§ 211 (f), 95 Stat. 299, amending I.R.C. § 46. The credit provisions did require that the invest-
ment be made in depreciable assets. I.R.C. § 48. If successful, the taxpayer could claim an
investment credit on the entire purchase price allocable to the lithographic plate and could
depreciate the recourse portion of the cost under an accelerated method of depreciation. In
addition, interest on the note could be deducted on the accrual method if the taxpayer could
demonstrate that he was engaged in a trade or business. See I.R.C. 163(d).
The opportunity for abuse was clear: investors did not really try to sell the output of the
plates, at least not at the level of return postulated by the value of the package. Because the
investor was not liable for payment on the nonrecourse note, and because his personal liability
was keyed to the value of retail sales, he was simply purchasing a favorable tax position. Even
under the new at-risk rules, inflated values and sham financing, if undetected, could allow the
taxpayer to recoup his investment solely through tax benefits. See discussion in Horwood &
Engelberg, Art Appreciation and Form 1040 - Blending Art and Tax Beneits, 4 REV. TAx.
INDrv. 195, 199-202 (1980); Robinson, Gimme Shelter: Art andthe IRS, 68 ART IN AMERICA 9
(1980).
The plan outlined above is substantially identical to one discredited by the Service in Rev.
Rul. 79-432, 1979-53 I.R.B. 20 (Jan. 7, 1980), which held that the assets purchased were not
depreciable and the recourse note provisions were such that personal liability did not exist in
reality.
I11. See notes 113-116 and accompanying text .hfra
112. The exploitation type of shelter might also have indirect implications for the charita-
ble deduction if the output of such print packages are donated to art institutions. One dealer
has remarked, "Some artists like Rauschenberg and Rosenquist have produced tax shelter
prints that are as good as anything they've done, but most of the work is beneath talking
about." Robinson, supra note 110, at 13. A flood of lesser quality print editions, and attempts
The contribution plan requires that a taxpayer acquire art ob-
jects at prices below retail, hold them for a year and a day, and then
contribute them to museums at their "appreciated" fair market val-
ues. The scheme generally involves a bulk purchase of collectibles
- limited edition prints, art books, gems and the like" 13 - and fre-
quently includes an expert appraisal as part of the package.I" a The
would-be donor may also receive an offer to arrange for placement
of the objects with donees,' 15 or at the very least, assurances that
museums, art organization, or other appropriate institutions will
gladly accept such gifts."
6
Even if the appraisals are not inflated, the spread between
wholesale price for a group of items and the retail price of a single
to donate prints based on the inflated tax shelter valuation, will necessarily impact on the
credibility of the art market and fine arts institutions.
113. VanderHook v. Comm'r, 36 T.C.M. (CCM) 1394 (1977) is an example of the contri-
bution plan utilizing a group of paintings, an unusual occurrence since individual paintings
and sculptures usually are not purchased in large enough quantities to obtain the advantage of
in-bulk discounts or wholesale prices.
114. See Crown Jewel of America Presents the 4 to 1, reprinted in Weil, The Deduction for
Charitable Contributions - What Should Be the Museum's Involvement, American Law Insti-
tute - American Bar Association Course of Study, Legal Problems of Museum Administra-
tion (March 17-19, 1981). See also, Gem Shelters, supra note 107, at 58 ("independent"
appraisals in reality by persons on retainer to promoter).
115. Under these circumstances, a serious question arises whether or not the ventures are
"investment contracts," and therefore offerings of securities subject to registration and disclo-
sure requirements of the Securities Act of 1933 and state blue sky laws. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l)
(1981). The Supreme Court has defined an investment contract as
a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common
enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third
party.
S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey & Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946). When the promoters of the art tax
shelter package undertake to secure appraisals and to arrange the donations it appears that
what is being sold is an investment "entrusting the promoters with both the work and the
expertise to make the tangible investment pay off," rather than merely the art objects them-
selves. Glen-Arden Commodities, Inc. v. Costantino, 493 F.2d 1027, 1035 (2d Cir. 1974). A
recent New York diamond investment plan case, under a blue sky law virtually identical to the
federal acts, found that when an investor has no practical control over his investment and must
rely on the promoters expertise to select an investment grade stone, and to assist in its resale,
the transaction involved an investment contract security. Gardner v. Lefkowitz, 97 Misc. 2d
806, 412 N.Y.S.2d 740 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1978). The court noted the factual similarity of the
case to S.E.C. v. Brigadoon Scotch Distr. Co., 480 F.2d 1047 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) in which the sale
of rare coin portfolios was held to constitute an investment contract. In Brigadoon, the
portfilios were generally selected by the defendants, thereby establishing investor dependence
on the expertise of the seller. For a discussion of the Gardner decision and its rationale, see
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,037 (Jan. 15, 1975). But cf. Robbins, Another Reflection on
Diamonds as Securities, NAT'L LAW J. 1, Oct. 13, 1980, at 1.
Most of the past cases have concerned investment plans with resale features rather than
contribution schemes. The S.E.C. has recently taken a no-action position in response to inquir-
ies from promoters of graphic portfolios who supply their customers with appraisals, a memo-
randum on the tax aspects of charitable contributions and, on request, a list of qualified
charitable organizations that are willing to accept art work. Although the transactions are
structured as volume discount sales, prospective purchasers are cautioned that the fair market
value of the works will fluctuate, that it will vary also with whether the portfolio is considered
in bulk or on a single piece basis, and that no guarantee is made that the art will appreciate.
S.E.C. Correspondence Pertaining to Securities Exchange Act of 1933, § 2(1), reprinted in 1981
Arts and the Law Conference Materials, Ass'n of the Bar of New York and Volunteer Lawyers
for the Arts, New York City (April 2-3, 1981).
116. Gem Shelters, supra note 107, at 49, 52 & 59. Crown Jewel, supra note 114.
item is such that the donor reaps a large tax benefit in a very short
time. This quick turnover and the volume of the gifts alerted the
IRS, thus prompting the Service to challenge the validity of the de-
ductions. The Service faced a dilemma, however, in that it wished to
retain retail price as an indicator of fair market value. Otherwise, it
would be forced to abandon that measure of value or maintain an
inconsistent position in the determination of estate taxes." 7
Attempts by the Service to get around the obstacle took several
forms. In Revenue Ruling 79-256, ml1 the taxpayer made a bulk
purchase of a substantial part of a limited edition and just over a
year later donated the lithographs to various museums, claiming a
deduction equal to four times the original purchase price. The Serv-
ice valued the gifts at cost for deduction purposes because "the fre-
quency and continuity of the contributions may be such as to be
substantially equivalent to the activities of a dealer."" 9 Moreover,
the contributions were not made after "a period of accumulation and
enjoyment."' 2° Thus, the service injected two novel tests into valua-
tion procedure-a level of donor activities test and an accumulation
and enjoyment test. Neither test has any rational basis in the Code.
As one commentator has correctly pointed out,' 2 ' conversion of a
non-dealer donor into a dealer because of the level of the donor's
contribution activity ignores the express language of the Code defin-
ing ordinary income property as that which is held "primarily for
sale to customers."' 22 Furthermore, this tax treatment of the gift is
inconsistent with the fact that had the taxpayer sold the prints, his
profits would have been taxed at long-term capital gain rates.1
2
1 Of
course, a requirement that a donor enjoy his property before he gives
it away does not appear anywhere in the Code. 24
Although the Service subscribes to its level of activities test in its
117. The fair market value of a particular item of property includible in the dece-
dent's gross estate is not to be determined by a forced sale price. Nor is thefair
market value of an item of property to be determined by the saleprice of the item in a
market other than that in whic such item is not commonly sold to the public, taking
into account the location of the item wherever appropriate. Thus, in the case of an
item of property includible in the decedent's gross estate, which is generally obtained
by thepublic in the retail market, thefair market value ojsuch an item ofproperty is the
price in which the item or a comparable item would be sold at retail
Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b), T.D. 6826, 1965-2 I.R.B. 367, at 368 (emphasis added).
118. Rev. Rul. 79-256, 1979-35 I.R.B. 5.
119. Id
120. Id at 6.
121. Anthoine, supra note 89, at 269-70.
122. I.R.C. § 1221(1). Anthoine also notes that the statutory reference is not to "a" trade
or business but to "his" trade or business. Anthoine, supra note 89, at 269.
123. Id
124. Cf. Technical Advice Memo. 7901001 (Sept. 15, 1977) (donation of books purchased
in bulk) (Code does not prohibit deduction because property was purchased with the intention
of making a contribution).
In addition, an accumulation and enjoyment test obviously discriminates unfairly be-
tween art objects and all other forms of property. Anthoine, supra note 89, at 269.
advisory publications, 2 recent rulings indicate a movement back to-
ward the more traditional and rational tests for fair market value.
The holding of Revenue Ruling 79-419126 was couched in terms of
"contribution activity. . . tantamount to the activity of a dealer,"' 2 7
but the Ruling also noted that the retail list price of the books in
question, maintained by the law of the foreign country in which they
were purchased, was insufficient evidence of fair market value in the
United States.'28 This observation set the stage for two 1980 Reve-
nue Rulings in which the Service invalidated contribution tax shel-
ters based upon an examination of the economic realities of the
marketplace. 2 9  The analysis in both rulings 30 turned on actual
transactions as the best evidence of fair market value and not some
artificially calculated estimate of retail price. 3'
To determine fair market value, reference was made to the most
active and comparable marketplace at the time of the donor's contri-
bution. Thus, the most probative evidence of fair market value is the
price at which similar quantities of prints, gems, or books are sold in
arms-length transactions, 32 allowing the Service to limit the donor's
deduction to his wholesale purchase price. This rationale is more
consistent with the treatment accorded other types of tax shelter in-
vestments in which the economic realities are examined to determine
if the transaction was bona fide and the tax benefits warranted.
33
Moreover, a consideration of actual transactions and comparable
markets is consistent with valuation procedures generally. IRS pol-
icy dictates that in most cases recent purchases or sales of the prop-
125. Your contribution activities are equivalent to the selling activities of a dealer if
you buy or produce property in bulk and distribute it to qualified organizations. Be-
cause this treatment applies only to charitable contributions, you are not considered
to be carrying on a trade or business for any other purpose.
Determining the Value of Donated Property, I.R.S. Pub. 561 (Rev. Nov. 1980) at 3.




129. Lerner, Planning the Collector's Estate, excerpt from Representing Artists, Collectors
and Dealers (PLI 1980), reprinted in 1981 Arts and the Law Conference materials, supra note
115, at 11-12.
130. Rev. Rul. 80-69, 1980-11 I.R.B. 5 (gems); Rev. Rul. 80-233, 1980-35 I.R.B. 6 (bibles).
131. Rev. Rul. 80-69, 1980-11 I.R.B. 5.
132. Rev. Rul. 80-233, 1980-35 I.R.B. 6; Rev. Rul. 80-69, 1980-11 I.R.B. 5.
133. See, e.g., Paul P. Brountas, 74 T.C. 1062 (1980) (total price of leveraged oil and gas
drilling venture was within "a reasonable range of commercial practice"); Arnold L. Ginsberg
v. Comm'r, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 860 (1976) (taxpayer has burden to show reasonable expectation
of profit from tax shelter venture); Estate of Charles T. Franklin v. Comm'r, 64 T.C. 752
(1975), afl'd, 544 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1976) (calculation of basis to include nonrecourse portion
of debt disallowed in real estate transaction because purported initial sales price had no corre-
lation to fair market value); Rev. Rul. 79-432, 1979-53 I.R.B. 20 (purported recourse note
deemed nonrecourse because liability could be satisfied by forfeiture of collateral at other than
current fair market value); I.R.C. § 465 (deductions limited to amounts for which investor is
personally liable).
erty itself are the most likely indicators of its value, 134 and that sales
made in a market "artificially supported or stimulated so as not to be
truly representative" are discounted.' 35
4 In-House Policing. -Attitudes among museum profession-
als run the gamut from a hands-off policy on the one hand, to a
"watchdog" stance on the other. Of course, primary legal responsi-
bility rests with the donor. Appraisals typically are performed by an
independent party and the museum never learns the amount of the
claimed deduction.1 36 Some curators and directors take the position,
therefore, that the museum is not involved and its duty only extends
to assuring that the museum does nothing to give the donor a false
impression of the value of the proposed gift. 37 Robert Johnson, a
curator at the Achenbach Foundation for the Graphic Arts, has com-
mented, "There is an Art Advisory Panel ...which oversees the
evaluation of works of art .. .and that's it as far as I'm con-
cerned. . . .We will accept the work of art and allow the law to
work properly through the Internal Revenue Service. "138
Others admit that there still are tremendous pressures to look
the other way when they learn of grossly exaggerated appraisals, es-
pecially if the item is one that they desperately want for a collec-
tion. 39 More and more frequently, however, museum professionals
are demonstrating an awareness that they occupy a position of pub-
lic trust and must accept responsibility to make certain, as far as pos-
sible, that the transactions are proper." ° They also recognize that
recent unfavorable media attention has led to a public perception of
museums as passive accomplices to tax shelters for the wealthy.' 4"
134. "The actual price at which property changes hands is far more compelling evidence
of market price than so-called expert opinions to the contrary." Gem Shelters, supra note 107,
at 61 (quoting unidentified IRS official). See notes 38-39 supra (cost method of valuation).
135. IRS Publication 561, supra note 125, at 5. See also note 117 supra
136. The IRS will naturally give less weight to any appraisal given by someone associated
with the donee institution. See IRS Publication 561, supra note 125, at 6; Rev. Proc. 66-49,
1966-2 C.B. 1257; Rev. Proc. 65-19, 1965-2 C.B. 1002.
As a matter of policy, most institutions will refuse to appraise objects having more than a
diminimus value to avoid the appearance of a conflict of interest. They are also careful that
more than one outside appraiser is recommended to guard against an impression of favoritism
or collusion. See Museum Ethics .4 Report to the American Association of Museums by Its
Committee on Ethics, MUSEUM NEWS, March/April 1978, at 25.
137. PRINT COLLECTOR'S NEWSLETTER, supra note 46, at 82-84.
138. Id at 83.
139. Id. Gem Shelters, supra note 107, at 50, 54 & 55. "If something really violates your
ethical sense, you can say, 'okay, we won't take it.' But if you carry that too far, you get to the
point where you're out of business." Id at 54 (quoting Paul Desautels, Curator, Division of
Mineralogy, Smithsonian Institution). See also PRINT COLLECTOR'S NEWSLETTER, supra note
46, at 83; note 70 supra.
140. Gem Shelters, supra note 107, at 54. "I do think there is some curatorial responsibil-
ity for making sure that the evaluation of a work of art is within reason." PRINT COLLECTOR'S
NEWSLETTER, supra note 46, at 83 (quoting Douglas Druck, Curator of Prints National Gal-
lery of Canada). See also id. at 84.
141. Statement by Stephen Weil, Deputy Director, Hirshhorn Museum of Art, at Ameri-
They see an affirmative duty not only to reject questionable dona-
tions, but also to caution donors against abusive practices. 42 The
duty arises, in their view, from a desire to protect their institutions
against charges of cooperation, from the fear that continued abuse
will result in the loss of the charitable deduction altogether, 43 and
from the belief that responsible collections management dictates that
museum resources cannot be squandered on objects accepted simply
to accommodate a donor.'"
C. Comments and Recommendations
If death and taxes are inevitable, so too are attempts to avoid
the payment of taxes. It hardly seems fair to single out gifts of ap-
preciated property for criticism, when the abuses in this area are no
more egregious than elsewhere. Indeed, the tax shelter schemes that
have provoked the ire of the IRS most recently were initially devised
using other types of property such as real estate transactions,
45 oil
and gas deals'" equipment leasing, 47 and livestock operations.
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can Law Institute - American Bar Association Legal Problems of Museum Administration
Course of Study (March 19, 1981).
142. PRINT COLLECTOR'S NEWSLETTER, supra note 46, at 84.
143. Id, Well, supra note 141.
144. See Statement of Robert Johnson, Curator of the Achenbach Foundation for the
Graphic Arts, in PRINT COLLECTOR'S NEWSLETTER, supra note 44, at 83; Museum Ethics,
supra note 136, at 23. See also Malero, Collections Management Workshop, AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE - AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION LEGAL PROBLEMS OF MUSEUM ADMINISTRATION
COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS 219, 221-23 (1981).
145. See, e.g., Estate of Charles T. Franklin v. Comm'r, 64 T.C. 752 (1975), aft'd, 544 F.2d
1045 (9th Cir. 1976) (leveraged sale-leaseback); Rev. Rul. 77-403, 1977-2 C.B. 302 (covenant
not to compete).
In the Franklin case, the court found that the transaction lacked economic reality, noting,
inter alia, that sale and lease "payments" were mere book entries cancelling each other out, the
purchase price had no correlation to the fair market value of the property, and the purported
seller remained in possession with complete discretion to manage, use and improve the prop-
erty. These features effectively translated the transaction into an option to purchase at a later
date, prior to which the taxpayer had no real equity or risk. 64 T.C. at 752.
Similarly, Rev. Rul. 77-403 held that a cash payment for a covenant not to compete ob-
tained from a real estate developer with no desire or ability to compete may not be amortized
over the life of the covenant but must be added to the basis of the property.
146. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 72-135, 1972-1 C.B. 200, Rev. Rul. 350, 2 C.B. 394 (Non-recourse
financing deemed contribution to capital by lender, denying tax basis treatment to limited
partners). See also Treas. Reg: § 1.612-3(8)(3) T.D. 7523, 1978-1 I.R.B. 192, at 194 (restricting
the use of current deduction for advanced royalties).
147. See, e.g., Perry v. United States, 520 F.2d 235 (4th Cir. 1975) (rental deduction allow-
able only if business purpose served by sale-leaseback transaction); Furman v. Comm'r, 45
T.C. 360 (1966), afdper curian, 381 F.2d 22 (5th Cir. 1967) (rental deduction available only
where lessee does not hold title or equitable interest in sale-leaseback property). Helvering v.
F & R Lazarus & Co., 308 U.S. 252 (1939) (depreciation, interest expenses and investment
credit disallowed to lessor when sale-leaseback masks mere financing arrangement). Cf. Frank
Lyon Co. v. United States, 98 S. Ct. 1291 (1978), rev'g 536 F.2d 746 (8th Cir. 1976) (presence
of independent third party mortgagee indicates genuine sale and leaseback).
148. See, e.g., Resnik v. Comm'r, 555 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1977), afdper cwiam, 66 T.C. 74
(1976) (prepayment of management fees interest and other expenses by cash basis taxpayers
disallowed).
James A. Smith v. Comm'r, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1246 (1976) (feed supplier advanced funds
for feed loan to investor who "purchased" feed through syndicator).
The number of permutations apparently is limited only by the inge-
nuity of the creators of the tax shelter schemes. No sooner does
Congress or the IRS move to plug a loophole than another springs
anew. 1
49
Nor have abuses been limited to investments in tangible prop-
erty. In the past, the charitable deduction provision was abused by
cash donors who gave in-trust gifts. Because the donor's ability to
raid the trust was not restricted until recently, the taxpayer could
claim a deduction for a benefit to a charity that never materialized in
reality. This problem led to the enactment of the Code provisions
that require strict adherence to particular formats for a charitable
trust. 
150
Similarly, the IRS can and has already begun to take steps to
tighten up the rules and regulations applicable to gifts of art. The
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 instituted a 10% to 30% penalty
on underpayments in excess of $1000 due to overvaluations of prop-
erty equal to 150% or more of the correct valuation.' 5' Additional
measures can be implemented to help prevent valuation abuses.
Appraisals should be required to accompany every tax return
claiming a deduction for a property contribution in excess of a cer-
tain minimum value.'52 Several of the bills to reinstate the artist's
deduction have also included a requirement that the donee institu-
tion issue a written certification of artistic, musical, or literary signifi-
cance. 5 3  At first glance, this requirement seems somewhat
redundant in light of the fact that the museum has already accepted
the gift, but it might serve to prompt already edgy museum officials
to scrutinize their acquisition policies more carefully and to advise
donors that they will not be a party to tax fraud. Curators and direc-
tors also might remind their patrons that the museum must make
accurate valuations for insurance purposes, and if the institution fol-
lows the Association of Independent Certified Public Accountants'
new guidelines, 54 to capitalize incoming gifts of art as part of the
149. Kurtz, Commissioner's Remarks on Abusive Tax Shelter Issues, 55 TAxEs 774, 776
(1977).
150. The stated congressional purpose for the reforms enacted in 1969 was to eliminate,
insofar as possible, discrepancies between the discounted value upon which the donor's tax
deduction was based and the value of the property actually received by charity. H.R. REP. No.
91-413 (Part 1), 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 58-59 (1969). The new rules governing life estates and
remainders, in trust and outright, are set forth in I.R.C. §§ 170(f), 642 & 664.
151. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 722, 95 Stat. 341. See also
notes 81-135 and accompanying text supra.
152. Presently, appraisals are not required for deductions of property gifts. The taxpayer
must substantiate the values claimed, but the substantiation need not be in the form of a writ-
ten appraisal. Rev. Proc. 66-49, 1966-2 C.B. 1257, 1258.
153. See, e.g., S. 1078, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
154. See Statement of FinancialAccounting Concepts No. 4-Objectives of Financial Report.
ing by Nonbusivess Organizations, 151 J. ACCOUNTANCY 111 (1981).
annual financial report. 5 The knowledge that such data would
then be available to the IRS as indicators of value may serve to re-
duce the temptation to donors to overvalue deductions.
While such deterrents to abuse ease the enforcement burden,
the enforcement procedures themselves must be strengthened as
well. The role of the advisory panels should be enlarged by reducing
the minimum review level.1 56 The Service will then be able to moni-
tor the contributions of smaller, lower-valued, decorative art items
that have become increasingly popular as collectibles.
The input from panel experts should carry considerable weight
in any judicial contest. It is neither desirable nor expedient for the
court to become involved in the evaluation of an object's artistic
merit. Nevertheless, market data and other objective indicators of
value must be considered, since in the last analysis, aesthetic judg-
ments are not adequate as yardsticks for measuring the claimed de-
duction. The taxpayer should be permitted to deduct the amount
that he has given up in economic terms. That amount can only be
measured by current fair market value, as unsatisfactory and incom-
plete a gauge of the "value" of art as that may be. The Service has
quite properly returned to this measure in its recent tax shelter rul-
ings, looking to bona fide transactions in the lowest regular market
as the best evidence of fair market value.
157
Finally, although litigation is expensive and time-consuming,
the Service should make it clear that in appropriate cases it is ready
to put the taxpayer to the test of his proof. A policy of settlement
negotiations only encourages inflated valuations. 58
IV. Attack on the Charitable Deduction Structure
A. Equity and Efficiency Considerations
L Impropriety or Horizontal Equity. -Criticisms directed
against the difficulties inherent in the charitable deduction system
itself generally rest on three grounds: improtriety, inefficiency and
inequity.5 9 The charge of impropriety is essentially a question of
horizontal equity. Advocates of this position view a charitable gift
as a voluntary personal consumption expenditure like any other.
They contend that an individual's tax liability should be based upon
155. Id at 119.
156. See notes 79 & 94 and accompanying text supra Professor Speiller recommends
$5,000 as a practical cut-off point. However, he also advocates eliminating the deduction for
items under $2,000 in value, a step that would seriously damage the collecting programs of
many institutions, particularly history museums. Speiller, supra note 8, at 242-46.
157. See notes 125-35 and accompanying text supra
158. But see note 43 upra
159. See generally Bittker, The Propriety and Vitality of a Federal Income Tax Deduction
for Private Philanthropy, TAx IMPACTS ON PHILANTHROPY 145 (1972).
the amount available to him for consumption, and not upon the
manner in which he spends it. A crucial distinction exists, however,
between charitable gifts and expenditures for blue jeans, football
games or art work. The latter involve some diversion of economic
resources away from the satisfaction of other people's needs, and in
many cases preclude their enjoyment by others.'60 Charitable giv-
ing, on the other hand, directs economic resources toward the satis-
faction of the needs of others.' 6' From this perspective, amounts
given to charity cannot be considered as part of an individual's con-
sumable income. 62 As one commentator has explained,
The primary intended effect of a direct, personal tax must be to
divert economic resources away from personal consumption and
accumulation. Some part of the national output which would
otherwise be consumed or accumulated by private individuals is
to be devoted to public purposes. Government expenditures are
the device by which particular goods and services are devoted to
public use, and taxation is the mechanism for imposing and dis-
tributing the corresponding reduction in consumption and ac-
cumulation which must accompany the commitment of part of the
aggregate national product to public purposes.'
63
Even if the consumption rationale is rejected, horizontal equity
often bows to the pressures of other policy considerations. The legis-
lative history of the charitable deduction provisions and the appreci-
ated property rules clearly reveal a desire to encourage philanthropic
giving and to promote property gifts to museums, libraries, and simi-
160. Not all social goods are exhausted when used by a single taxpayer. See notes 230-232
and accompanying text infra.
161. Bittker, supra note 159, at 153. Of course, the donor's gift may "buy" him position,
power or prestige. See notes 163 & 172 infra.
162. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 4 COMMISSION RESEARCH
PAPERS, supra note 6, at 2189 (1977).
163. Id at 2189. Others have argued in rebuttal that the tax should fall upon thepower to
consume, that is, on the ability to direct the disposition of goods and services even if directed
for the benefit of others. Id at 2188. This objection can be met on many levels. Expenditures
of money are not the only means by which individuals exercise power over the allocation of
economic resources. Influence derived from direct participation in political and economic af-
fairs cannot practically be subject to taxation, nor would we want it to be. Id Following this
line of reasoning it becomes apparent that the exercise of such allocative power is desirable. It
encourages the democratic pluralism on which our free-market system is based, and which is
valuable in the philanthropic arena as well. See notes 239-245 and accompanying text infra
(need forprivate philanthropy).
Supporters of tax credit and matching grant systems as alternatives for the deduction fail
to note that those plans similarly distinguish among taxpayers by reason of their expenditures,
providing an economic lever to those who exercise their power of consumption to direct re-
sources toward charitable purposes. Bittker, supra note 159 at 155. Indeed, supporters of
those alternatives recognize the need to preserve pluralism in charitable giving. See note 244
and accompanying text infra.
Furthermore, if income tax were to be levied on the power to consume for private benefit,
whether exercised or not, measurement of that power by realized income alone would operate
as an injustice. The Code does not impute income from non-income producing activities, such
as services donated to charity, or household tasks performed by the homeowner; nor from that
portion of an individual's income capacity which is not maximized, for example, the earning
power of a teacher or clergyman who could have entered a more lucrative profession.
lar institutions.161 Such favorable treatment can hardly be attacked
as improper when other measures designed to benefit particular spe-
cial interests or to effectuate other social policies abound throughout
the Code. The recent battle between supporters of carry-over basis
and proponents of stepped-up basis represents a classic illustration
of a clash between conflicting interests. Carry-over basis would have
enabled the Treasury to recoup revenues from appreciation that
otherwise escapes taxation.1 65 The current stepped-up basis rules, in
contrast, allow farmers and other property owners to consolidate
their family holdings, precisely because the owner's heirs will not
have to sell the property to pay taxes on appreciated value. 66 Simi-
larly, the special use valuation provision of the estate tax reflects a
legislative judgment that the national economy can forego the addi-
tional revenue from taxing property at its highest and best use in
order to encourage the continued use of property for farming and
other small business purposes.167  Other examples of special tax
breaks include the investment tax credit, 68  the earned income
credit, 169 and energy conservation credits. 170  The proper inquiry,
therefore, is not whether a special group or interest receives a benefit
164. The intention to serve a particular social policy objective, at the behest of a special
interest group, is especially evident in the discussions of the 1969 proposal to eliminate the fair
market value deduction of capital gain property:
The bill prohibits deduction of the value of ordinary income property unless the
appreciation is included in ordinary income. But the extension of this rule to gifts of
all works of art, even though not created by the donor, appears unduly severe. Our
finest museums and art galleries are dependent on such gifts, and their contribution
to the good of our society is universally acknowledged.
Statement of Edwin S. Cohen, Ass't. Sec. of Treasury for Tax Policy, Hearings on H. & 13270
Before the Senate Committee on Finance 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 570-71 (1969).
165. I.R.C. § 1023, repealed by Pub. L. No. 96-223, § 401(a), 94 Stat. 299 (1980). See S.
REP. No. 95-1263, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 275, 277 [1978), reprinted in [19781 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 735, 737 (supplemental views of Hon. Win. D. Hathaway) (postponement of effec-
tive date).
Carry-over basis would also have promoted the life-time liquidation of property holdings.
Under the stepped-up basis rule, persons in their later years who might otherwise sell property
are effectively prevented from doing so because they realize that the appreciation in that asset
will be taxed as income if they sell before death, but will not be subject to income tax if they
hold the asset until their death. H.R. REP. No. 94-1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 36-37 (1976),
reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3356, 3390-91.
166. See S. REP. No. 96-394, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 165, 170-71 (1979) reprinted in [1980]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 567, 572-73 (additional views of Sen. Dole).
The administrative complexities of implementing the carry-over rules were an additional
factor leading to their repeal. Id at 122-23, [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 530-31.
167. See I.R.C. § 23032A.
Valuation on the basis of highest and best use, rather than actual use, may result in
. . . substantially higher estate taxes. In some cases. .. because the income poten-
tial from these activities is insufficient to service extended tax payments or loans ob-
tained to pay the tax ... the heirs may be forced to sell the land for development
purposes.
H.R. REP. No. 94-1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 21-22 (1976), reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 3356, 3375-76.
168. I.R.C. § 38. To stimulate capital investment, section 38 provides a tax credit for up to
10% of the investment that a taxpayer makes in certain types of depreciable property.
169. Id § 43. A credit is available to a low income worker who maintains a household for
himself and dependent children.
in violation of the theoretical principles of horizontal equity, but
whether the policy promoted thereby is consonant with the national
value scheme.
2 Inefficiency. -The second prong of the attack on the chari-
table deduction is the argument that the deduction is an inefficient
tool for stimulating philanthropy. 7' These critics question whether
the deduction promotes giving in addition to that which would occur
in any event.
172
Until the changes made by the 1981 tax bill, the deduction was
only available to those who itemized their deductions, which in 1979
was approximately 30% of all taxpayers. 173 Of those who itemized
and claimed the charitable deduction, the vast majority claimed do-
nations less than the standard deduction. 74 Thus, the incentive was
conditioned by the availability of other deductions, such as home
mortgage payments, interest on installment purchases, local sales
taxes, and medical expenses. 175 The Economic Recovery Tax Act of
1981176 alleviated the problem by instituting, on a trial basis, 177 a
deduction for charitable gifts by non-itemizers. A similar measure
had been opposed by the Carter administration because Treasury of-
ficials believed that it would not result in increased giving by non-
170. Id § 44C. A taxpayer may claim an income tax credit for energy-conserving ex-
penses incurred with respect to his principal residence after April 19, 1977 and before 1986.
171. In a 1967 study, Professor Michael R. Taussig of the Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology concluded that the deduction was only 5% effective, on the theory that the deduction
cost the Treasury $20 in uncollected taxes for every dollar that it induced taxpayers to contrib-
ute to charity, but Taussig was able to analyze tax returns for only one year. Taussig, Eco-
nomic Aspects of the Income Tax Treatment of Charitable Contributions, 20 NAT'L TAX J. 1
(1967).
In 1970, Professor Robert A. Schwartz of New York University published a study based
on a somewhat larger body of data. His conclusions were not nearly as negative as Taussig's,
but they still indicated that the deduction cost the Treasury more in taxes than the charitable
donees gained: Schwartz, Personal Philanthropic Contributions, 78 J. PoLITIcAL ECONOMY
1264 (1970).
172. Those who donate to museums and other institutions are prompted by a variety of
incentives in addition to tax considerations. Some contribute because the museum provides an
economic and cultural stimulus to the community. Some seek social status or personal fulfill-
ment. Others desire to be remembered in perpetuity. See W.S. HENDON, ANALYZING AN ART
MUSEUM 216 (1979); Gem Shelters, supra note 105, at 62.
173. Statement of Hon. Donald C. Lubick, Ass't Sec. of Treasury, 1980 Hearings, supra
note 7, at 63, 67 (Table 2).
174. In 1977, the Tax Reduction and Simplification Act replaced the standard deduction
with the zero bracket amount. A flat rate "standard deduction" was built into the tax tables as
the zero bracket amount, so that there was no tax on amounts of income up to $2,200 or $3,200
depending on the filing status. Pub. L. No. 95-30, § 101, 91 Stat. 134 (1977).
The terms "standard deduction" and "zero bracket amount" are used interchangeably in
this comment.
175. McDaniel, An Alternative to the Federal Income Tax Deduction in Support 0/Private
Philanthropy, in TAX IMPACTS ON PHILANTHROPY 171, 178 (1972).
176. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 121, 95 Stat. 196 (1981),
amending I.R.C. § 170.
177. See note 35 supra
itemizers. 7 8
Although it is too early to judge the effect of the charitable de-
duction's increased availability, other tax theorists dispute the ineffi-
cient incentive charge.' 79 They claim that charitable giving is price
elastic, that is, a taxpayer who can transfer $1 to his favorite charity
at a cost to himself of only $.50 will be much more inclined to make
the gift than one who must pay out a full $1 to transfer that
amount. 18
0
The most recent studies support the conclusion that the deduc-
tion is indeed an effective incentive. Research conducted for the
Filer Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs indi-
cated that for every dollar of taxes uncollected because of the chari-
table deduction, more than one dollar in giving is stimulated.'
Utilizing the most extensive body of data ever assembled for the pur-
pose, Professor Feldstein of Harvard University found that eliminat-
ing the charitable contribution deduction would reduce total
itemized giving by approximately 28% to 56%. He concluded that
charities would lose more in the contributions they now receive than
the government would gain in additional tax revenues.'8 2  Con-
versely, Professor Feldstein's studies indicate that extending the
charitable deduction to non-itemizers would increase total charitable
giving. 183
178. See Statement of Hon. Donald C. Lubick, Ass't. Sec. of Treasury. 1980 Hearings,
supra note 7, at 63. The Secretary cited data showing that the percentage of personal income
given to charity by individuals over the years has remained relatively constant while the
number of taxpayers who utilize the standard deduction has fluctuated. Id at 65-67.
Treasury officials also based their opposition on the increased complexity that would be
introduced into the tax return system. Id at 64-65.
The measure that was incorporated into the 1981 tax bill was not identical to that dis-
cussed in the 1980 Hearings. See S. 219, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
179. See, e.g., Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 4 COMMISSION RE-
SEARCH PAPERS, supra note 6, at 2193 (1977); Bittker, supra note 159. See also note 182 infra.
180. Bittker, supra note 159, at 158.
181. Giving in America." Toward a Stronger Voluntary Sector, Report of the Filer Commis-
sion on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs - A Summary, 115 TR. & EST. 84, 130 (1976).
182. Feldstein, The Income Tax and Charitable Contributions: Part I -Aggregate and Dis-
tn'bution Effects, 28 NAT'L TAX J. 81, 97 (1975). See also Boskin and Feldstein, Effects of the
Charitable Deduction on Contributions by Low-Income and Middle-Income Households: Evi-
dence from the National Survey of Philanthropy, 59 REV. OF ECONOMICS & STATISTICS 351
(1977); Feldstein & Clotfelter, Tax Incentives and Charitable Contributions in the United States,
5 J. OF PUB. ECONOMICS 1 (1976); Feldstein and Taylor, The Income Tax and Charitable Con-
tributions, 44 ECONOMETRICS 1201 (1076). These studies are also reprinted in 1980 Hearings,
upra note 7, at 236, and 3 COMMISSION RESEARCH PAPERS, supra note 6, at 1393.
Feldstein's statistical method separates the "price" or tax effect from the effect of in-
creased income and other factors that influence charitable giving. Statement of Martin Feld-
stein, Professor of Economics, Harvard University, 1980 Hearings, supra note 7, at 219.
183. Id at 308. Statement of Charles T. Clotfelter, 1980 Hearings, supra note 7, at 312.
A Gallup survey conducted before the 1981 revisions also found that itemizers give more
than those who take the standard deduction. Statement of Hon. Barber B. Conables, Jr., Rep-
resentative from New York, 1980 Hearings, supra note 7, at 24.
3. Vertical Equity. -The final, and perhaps most damaging
criticism, hinges on the concept of vertical equity. Because the de-
ductions vary in value with the taxpayer's marginal tax rate, they
inure more to the benefit of upper income taxpayers in violation of
the progressive rate schedule. Vertical equity requires that the same
incentive should operate for those who donate similar percentages of
their income. Instead, the deduction offers the greatest financial in-
centive for those who have the least financial need. It is presumably
less burdensome for the person with an income of $200,000 per year
to donate 10% to charity than it is for a $12,000 per year wage earner
to give the corresponding 10%. Yet, the taxpayer in the higher tax
bracket will receive the greater tax savings. s4 Furthermore, these
same high bracket taxpayers are more likely to itemize and to have a
proportionately greater amount of accumulated wealth or unearned
income185 to draw upon for donations. Because of the generally high
cost of museum-quality objects, the wealth of high tax bracket indi-
viduals is more often in the form of art than that of lower income
taxpayers.186 Thus, the added benefits of contributing appreciated
property are probably more readily available to the high income tax-
payer than to the average wage earner.
Tax equity, however, is not the ultimate goal of the taxation
scheme. Rather, the intent of taxation should be to direct economic
resources toward the provision of social goods in the most equitable
manner. 8 7 Insofar as this process involves a redistribution of eco-
nomic resources, tax incentives to charitable giving operate in the
direction of equity. As one commentator has noted:
By practically any economic, social or political standard, it is de-
sirable to have more of the resources of those of substantial means
and high incomes go voluntarily to the less fortunate people. It
certainly should not disturb us to know that it is more attractive
184. McDaniel, supra note 175, at 178-79.
185. Brannon, A Pro-Charity Substitutefor the Present Law Tax Treatment ofAppreciated
Property Contributed to Charity, in 4 COMMISSION RESEARCH PAPERS, supra note 6, at 2275.
186. But see note 78 and accompanying text supra (participation of middle income groups
in the collecting boom).
187. Professor Andrews notes that if the intent of the deduction is to treat the taxpayer
who contributes part of his earnings to charity in the same manner as the Code, by the non-
impution of income, treats the individual who has diverted a portion of his personal energies
from earning money toward the service of charitable enterprises, the donor of unearned in-
come occupies an anomolous position.
It cannot be argued... that a charitable deduction will operate to treat him as if he
were performing services for the charity instead of earning money and turning it
over, since he is not earning any in any event. Nor can it be argued in this situation
that the incentive effect of the charitable contribution deduction serves to offset the
disincentive effect of the tax on remunerative employment.
Andrews, supra note 162, at 2198. Nevertheless, Professor Andrews argues that the deduction
for these taxpayers is still justified by the fact that most taxpayers at some point face invest-
ment decisions with respect to which the tax effect is not neutral and which may reduce the
level of charitable giving. Moreover, even if this is not so for a particular taxpayer, tax equity
requires that should receive a charitable deduction since other taxpayers do. Id
for the rich than it is for those of more moderate income to give
away p art of their income and wealth. The rich have the capacity
to make substantial contributions.'
88
Considerations of efficiency, therefore, would seem to conflict
with the concept of vertical equity. Assuming that high bracket tax-
payers are very responsive to the tax savings from charitable giving,
a truly efficient tax system would liberalize the benefits accorded to
the rich.I89 Congress, recognizing the need to balance the twin goals
of equity and efficiency, has taken a middle course by allowing the
deduction to distort the progressivity of the income tax while simul-
taneously limiting the availability of the benefit by placing a ceiling
on the amount that may be deducted. 90 As one noted tax authority
has pointed out, the qualifications and exceptions with which the
Code is riddled belie the notion that progression must be served
above all else. "What Congress has enacted is a progressive struc-
ture with deductions, you cannot hold up one as the authentic voice
of the people and condemn the other as a craven surrender to special
privilege. ... 191
Moreover, if the deduction is criticized because it is an ineffi-
cient incentive, it does not seem consistent to attack the system, in
the same breath, because it encourages giving that proceeds from a
desire to take advantage of tax savings.'92 If the basic premise for
the deduction is to promote the disgorgement of wealth in order to
188. Statement of Robert Nathan, on behalf of the Council of Voluntary Agencies, in 1973
Hearings, supra note 7, at 6164.
189. Bittker, supra note 159, at 159. One might also advance the efficiency argument in
support of the treatment accorded the high tax bracket taxpayer in regard to gifts of appreci-
ated property.
The current tax treatment of donations of services effectively places those contributors on
the same footing as cash contributions. See note 187, supra. If the lower income taxpayers are
more likely to donate their time and labor than their money, the progressive nature of the
income tax would be restored. Studies have shown, however, that for every dollar contributed,
an equivalent dollar's worth is given in the form of volunteer work. Statement of Sen. Bill
Bradley, 1980 Hearings, supra note 7, at 197.
190. See note 3 supra
Those who believe that the public interest is better served if the moderately well-
to-do and the very rich make gifts of their property to charity rather than keep it
therefore inevitably confront a conflict in values. The values to be served by encour-
aging the gift (support for public charities and the promotion of greater equalization
of wealth) conflict with the value served by a simple and symmetrical tax system in
which all taxpayers with similar incomes pay similar taxes. It is my view that the 30%
rule which now serves to limit the amount of the deduction against other income
which can be taken by a taxpayer is a reasonable compromise between those two
values.
Statement of Hugh Calkins, on behalf of the Cleveland Coalition on Tax Reform, 1973 Hear-
ings, supra note 7, pt. 16, at 6463-64. The Presidential Task Force on the Arts and the Human-
ities, however, advocates eliminating the 50% ceiling on gifts to public charities and raising the
30% ceiling on gifts of appreciated property to 50%. [1981] DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) G-6 to G-
7 (Oct. 14, 1981).
191. Bittker, supra note 159, at 160. Professor Bittker suggests further that the revenue
loss from cutting the effective tax rates of charitable donors, via the deduction, could be
recouped by increasing the rates on the classes of adjusted gross income that enjoy the benefit
of the deduction. Id at 161.
192. See S. REp. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 80-81 (1969).
provide public goods and services, then tax neutrality for charitable
giving is not desirable. Rather, if the ownership of art objects and
cultural treasures is concentrated in the hands of the wealthy, it is
entirely in accord with equitable principles to design tax incentives
that will encourage the rich to donate art objects to institutions
charged with making them available to the public at large.'
9 3
In order to make the system more "equitable," critics of the cur-
rent deduction scheme have proposed various tax credit alterna-
tives.' 94 The difficulty with these proposals is that they equalize the
tax treatment of donors by reducing the incentive effect for high tax
bracket donors and by increasing the incentive for lower income
groups. If the low income donors respond to the heightened incen-
tive, the total dollar amount of the contributions may remain con-
stant, but the types and destinations of these gifts could vary
considerably. Evidence indicates that the lower bracket taxpayers
donate more often to churches, religious organizations, and commu-
nity charity funds.'95 Colleges, universities, museums, libraries, and
symphonies depend more heavily on the largess of the wealthy.
196
The gifts of appreciated property that are the lifeblood of museums
also generally originate with the higher income groups.' 97 Further-
more, many non-profit organizations rely in large measure on "lead-
ership gifts" by wealthy individuals to set the pace for other
donations.'98 These gifts quite often take the form of appreciated
property. 1
99
193. See discussion accompanying notes 218-29 infra.
194. Statement of Robert 0. Bothwell, Executive Director, Nat'l Committee for Respon-
sive Philanthropy, in 1980 Hearings, supra note 7, at 375 (30% optional credit); Brannon, supra
note 185 (combination of deduction, 5% credit for gifts in excess of 6% of adjusted gross in-
come and income recognition of capital gains on gifts of appreciated property); Feldstein and
Taylor, The Income Tax and Charitable Contributions, 44 ECONOMETRICA 1201 (1976) (25%
credit); Hochman and Rodgers, The Optimal Tax Treatment of Charitable Contributions, 30
NAT'L TAX J. 1 (1977).
Hochman and Rodgers do not advocate the credit system on the traditional bases of tax
equity and egalitarian value judgments but on the grounds that it is economically more effi-
cient. They assert that a deduction "subsidy" that increases with income can only be justified
if the beneficiaries of the rich generate more pervasive external benefits to the community at
large. They add the caveat, however, that "the case for a tax credit ... may be vitiated by
differences in substantive giving." Id at 13-14. See note 195 and accompanying text infra.
195. See Tables I and 2 in Feldstein, The Income Tax and Charitable Contributions, Part
II - The Impact on Religious, Educational and Other Organizations, 28 NAT'L TAX J. 209, 214
(1975); see also R. BARLOW, H. BRAZER AND J. MORGAN, EcONoMIc BEHAVIOR OF THE AF-
FLUENT 106 (1966).
196. Feldstein, supra note 195.
197. See notes 185-86 and accompanying text supra
198. See discussion in Weithorn, Prospective Impact of '76 TRA, 55 TAXES 243, 247
(1977).
199. "In most cases property gifts account for 30 to 65 percent of gifts to colleges and
universities, to cultural and civic institutions, and to many of the campaigns for capital im-
rovements conducted periodically by health, welfare and youth organizations." Statement of
John J. Schwartz, American Association of Fund-Raising Counsel, Inc., 1973 Hearings, supra
note 7, at 6261-62.
B. The Tax Expenditure Theory
Many of the critics who raise the equity and efficiency objec-
tions to the charitable deduction do so based on the theory that the
deduction operates as a government expenditure equivalent in
amount and distribution to the revenue reduction that it produces. 2°°
From this perspective, the Code's discrimination in favor of the
wealthy, by virtue of the graduated tax rates, allows high income
donors to control the flow of such federal expenditures. The theory
postulates, for example, that for every $100 gift by a 50% taxpayer,
the government subsidizes $50 and the taxpayer contributes $50.
For the same gift by a 30% taxpayer, the government only loses $30
in tax revenue, as opposed to the $70 cost to the taxpayer.
The tax expenditure label obviously conveys the implication
that all income belongs presumptively to the government and that
what it does not tax is a subsidy to the citizens. Proponents of the
theory dispute such a characterization. They contend that the theory
merely recognizes alternative methods of achieving social policy
objectives. The elimination of a deduction, for example, would pro-
vide additional revenues that could be used to cut tax rates, to in-
crease other deduction provisions, or to increase expenditures.
Sound government planning then dictates consideration of efficiency
and equity criteria in choosing the appropriate means to the desired
social goal. 20 1
Even if this formulation of the tax expenditure theory as an effi-
ciency doctrine is accepted, it should be noted that the theory applies
to tax credits and exclusions as well as to deductions. Because cred-
its are available to all taxpayers without regard to their marginal tax
brackets, the discrimination implicit in the progressive rate structure
does not operate for tax credit "expenditures" as it does for deduc-
tions. Nevertheless, like all tax relief provisions, the monies dis-
200. The administration and the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Fi-
nance Committee publish estimates in conjunction with the federal budget showing the reve-
nue costs of various provisions of the tax law as if they were direct government expenditures.
See, e.g., Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures/or Fiscal Years 1980-1985 in HousE COMMIT-
TEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., MARCH 15TH REPORT TO THE HOUSE
BUDGET COMMITTEE ON THE FISCAL YEAR 1981 BUDGET 65 (Comm. Print 1980); Tax Ex-
penditures, Special Analysis G, Special Analysis ofthe Budget of the United States Government
for Fiscal Year 1981 207.
See generally Surrey, Federal Income Tax Reform The Varied Approaches Necessary to
Replace Tax Expenditures with Direct Governmental Assistance, 84 HARV. L. REV. 352 (1970).
Bittker, Accountingfor Federal Tax Subsidies in the National Budget, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 244
(1969); Surrey & Heilmuth, The Tax Expenditure Budget." Response to Professor Bittker, 22
NAT'L TAX J. 528 (1969); Bittker, The Tax Expenditure Budget - A Reply to Professors Surrey &
Hellmuth, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 538 (1969). See also Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Devicefor Imple-
menting Government Policy.- A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L.
REV. 705 (1970).
201. Discussion of Support of Private Philanthropy Through Federal Income Tax Laws, in
TAX IMPACTS OF PHILANTHROPY 229-232 [1972).
pensed via credits remain free from direct government control
through budget and appropriation procedures.2 °2
The subsidy concept applies most forcefully to gifts of appreci-
ated property. If income is defined as aggregate personal consump-
tion plus accumulation, the deduction for charitable contributions
can be justified as a means of offsetting the inclusion in gross income
of receipts that have been turned over to philanthropic use.203
Under the present deduction system, however, the appreciated por-
tion of the fair market values of a donated object is never included in
income; it escapes taxation entirely.2°4 With the exception of be-
quests of appreciated property at the owner's death,20 5 the Code does
not permit appreciation to excape taxation in any other instance of a
transfer of appreciated property.2°6 But as one commentator has ob-
served, the special capital gain rates allow a portion of the realized
gain to be devoted to current private consumption without ever bear-
ing tax at current ordinary income rates.20 7 Thus,
[t]he difficulties are not solely, or even primarily, a product of the
charitable contribution deduction, . . . The capital gains rules in
particular are themselves inconsistent with the underlying thesis
that tax should be evenly laid on total consumption plus accumu-
lation without distinctions according to differences in source, and
the charitable contribution deduction only puts that inconsistency
into sharper focus.
20 8
Although it is true that under the charitable deduction provi-
sions the taxpayer is also relieved of even this reduced tax on capital
gain, the donor is no further ahead since he has given up the prop-
erty and has thereby lost all opportunity to benefit from the realiza-
202. Andrews, supra note 162, at 2207 n.4.
203. See notes 160-63 and accompanying text supra
204. See notes 18-19 and accompanying text supra.
205. Under § 104 of the Internal Revenue Code, the recipient of the testator's property
receives a basis measured by the fair market value of the property at the date of death, or the
alternate valuation date. This "stepped-up" basis permits the appreciation represented by the
difference between the testator's basis and the donee's basis to go untaxed. Congress recently
attempted to rectify this situation by imposing a "carry over basis" but the provision met with
vigorous opposition and was repealed even before it could be placed into effect. See I.R.C.
§ 1023, repealed by Pub. L. 96-223, § 401(a), 94 Stat. 299 (April 2, 1980). For a discussion of
the conflicting policies and rationales see notes 165-66 and accompanying text supra.
206. If an individual transfers appreciated property to another party for cash or property,
he will receive taxable gain or loss, capital or ordinary. I.R.C. §§ 1001, 1221, 1222. If an
individual makes an intervivos non-charitable gift, he does not realize income but the donee
must assume a carry-over basis. I.R.C. § 1015. This carry-over basis might be considered the
price of nonrealization. It insures that someone -albeit not the original taxpayer - will eventu-
ally be taxed on the appreciated value of the property. In the case of a casualty loss, the
deduction is the unreimbursed amount of loss, but limited to the property's basis. I.R.C.
§§ 163, 1033. See discussion in Mansfield & Groves, LegalAspects of Charitable Contributions
of Appreciated Property to Public Charities in 4 COMMISSION RESEARCH PAPERS, upra note 6,
at 2264.
207. See note 29 supra
208. Andrews, upra note 162, at 2200.
tion of gain at the time of disposition.2" Indeed, as previously
noted,210 the current capital gain rates insure that it will always be
less advantageous for the taxpayer to make a donation than to sell
capital gain property provided that the valuation is not inflated. A
contributor of property does secure more favorable tax benefits than
a contributor of a comparable amount of cash, but the proper meas-
ure of the deduction, it is submitted, can only be that which the do-
nor has given up. In this case, the donor sacrifices the opportunity to
profit by the sale of his property.
Once the possibility of undue profit by giving is eliminated and
abuses are brought under control the issues of tax subsidy versus
incentive and tax equity versus efficiency are reduced to merely aca-
demic questions of semantics. The "logic" of the Code has been sac-
rificed to achieve pragmatic consequences in the past; there seems to
be little reason why its purity should be so strictly guarded in this
instance.
V. The Social Policy Perspective
One of the concerns that emerges from the criticism of the chari-
table deduction, particularly among those who espouse the tax ex-
penditure theory, is the absence of public control over funds flowing
to what are ultimately public institutions. The problem is funda-
mentally one of determining the proper relationship between public
and private endeavors.2 ' Any activity of communal interest may be
conducted by one or any combination of three mechanisms: the
commercial marketplace, the government, or philanthropy. 21 2 In
general, government and philanthropic involvement are triggered
when the private marketplace fails to provide a sufficient quantity of
valuable goods or services. Considerations of tax structure, there-
fore, are less important than questioning, first, whether museums
and the arts are commonly-held values; second, whether the com-
mercial marketplace adequately supports and promotes the arts; and
last, if it does not, what combination of public and private effort is
necessary and desirable to provide those valued activities.
209. See the comparison of the tax results of a sale, a gift of property, and a cash contribu-
tion, at note 19 supra
210. See notes 29-34 and accompanying text supra
211. This question is one that the Reagan administration is currently grappling with. It
has been suggested that the cutback in government support for social and cultural programs is
not merely a search for ways in which to trim the national budget but involves a more funda-
mental re-evaluation of public and private roles. Advocates, supra note 86, at 17.
212. Sacks, The Role of Phlanthropy: An Institutional View, 46 VA. L. REv. 516, 519
(1960).
A. The Role of Museums and Art Institutions
I The Historical View. -In the past, museums were often con-
sidered the private preserves of the wealthy, and art was viewed as a
luxury to be enjoyed by a social elite.21 3 Although this observation
was true to a certain extent at one time, its unqualified acceptance
provides a somewhat distorted view of the historical development of
museums and art collecting in America.
American collecting has always been imbued with the republi-
can spirit that characterized the social and political organization of
the country in general. The origins of European museums derive
from the acquisitive activities of the royalty and nobility; their
growth was due to the mighty patrons and collectors of Church and
State.214 In America, by contrast, there were no Roman emperors,
Bourbon kings, German princelings, or Medici popes. Whether mo-
tivated by the desire to share knowledge and enjoyment with others,
or to promote the development of the community, or to derive per-
sonal economic profit, the earliest American collectors represented a
wide spectrum of intellects and of social and economic
backgrounds.21 5
The nineteenth century saw the amassing of great fortunes and
the development of a leisure class able to acquire many of the great
art works of Western Europe.2 6 The collectors, patrons and connis-
seurs of that era were indeed a select and fortunate few, but the
country was the ultimate beneficiary. Through gifts, bequests, and
endowments, the wealthy of the last century established or strength-
ened the museums that today benefit all.2 17
2. The Value of Museums. A Consumer Analysis. -While there
may have been a time when social and economic elitism dominated
the operation of American art institutions,218 the modem museum
clearly serves as expanded public. Attendance figures nearly
213. See Statement of Charles Van Ravenswaay, Ass'n of Art Museum Directors, 1973
Hearings, supra note 7, at 6101-02. A. SAARINEN, THE PROUD POSSESSORS xxii-xxiii (1958); A.
WITLIN, MUSEUMS: IN SEARCH OF A USABLE FUTURE 478 (1970).
214. Id
215. Moreover, in the early years of the republic, the general citizenry were often given
access to collections owned by private individuals or groups. Id
216. SAARINEN, supra note 213.
217. In the United States, museums were founded for the most part by a few civic leaders
who provided endowments through gifts and bequests to support these institutions for the
benefit of the public at large. Statement of Charles Van Ravenswaay, Ass'n of American Art
Directors, 1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 6101-02. Mr. Van Ravenswaay also pointed out two
aspects of the development of American museums. First, almost all founding boards were
composed of individuals representing the public interest. They included not only civic leaders,
but also leading educators. Second, museums sprang up spontaneously in many cities,
founded and supported entirely by local sources. Id
218. In 1942, in a study conducted for the American Association of Museums, Theodore
L. Low decried the attitude that "The right to approach aesthetic qualities is considered a
reached the fifty million mark in a 1979 sampling of 609 art muse-
ums.2 '9 But increase in attendance is not as significant as the recent
commitment by museums to reach new audiences and to become an
activist educative force 220 among blacks, the poor, the aged, the
handicapped, ethnic minorities, and blue collar workers.22'
A broadened base of patronage indicates a corresponding
change in the internal control of art institutions.
Because there are now more institutions clamoring for financial
support, and because of progressive fashion, there are now rela-
tively fewer authentic millionaires who can, or will, pick up that
mighty fountain pen. In consequence, cultural institutions have
had to seek financial support from the comfort class, the new rich,
from businesses and other elements in the community, as well as
from old-line wealth.222
Today's trustees still contribute approximately 20% of the private
support received by art museums, but they are more often chosen for
their business acumen and fund-raising ability than for their large
donations or important contributions of art.22 3
3. The Value of Museums.: A Functional Analysis. -The public
services offered by American museums fall generally into the three
main categories of preservation, scholarship, and access. Museums
collect, preserve, and protect objects
treasured for their association with events and personalities of his-
tory, for their significance in representing human excellence in
terms of scientific ingeniousness or of artistic achievement and for
providing samples of the natural environment or objects related to
human ways of living at different times and in different
societies.224
Research conducted by museum curators and by scholars studying
museum collections results in increased knowledge about and under-
standing of these objects, their makers, and the civilizations that fos-
tered them. This research is often published in scholarly journals or
presented to the public in exhibition catalogues. Finally, museums
present the objects to the public in exhibitions designed to enhance
the public's knowledge and appreciation. They also provide more
privilege of wealth and leisure .... AM. ASS'N OF MUSEUMS, MUSEUMS: THEIR NEW AUDI-
ENCE 7 (1972) (Report to the Department of Housing and Urban Development).
219. The exact numbers reported were 49,825,727. Preliminary Data for the National
Center for Education Statistics Museum Program Survey (Dept. of Education 1979) as re-
ported by telephone conversation with Thomas Litkowski, Program Director, Institute of Mu-
seum Services, March 23, 1981.
220. AM. ASS'N. OF MUSEUMS, MUSEUMS: THEIR NEW AUDIENCE 8 (1972) (Report to the
Department of Housing and Urban Development).
221. Id at 13.
222. A. TOFFLER, THE CULTURE CONSUMERS 62 (1964).
223. NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS, MUSEUMS U.S.A.: A SURVEY REPORT 312-
315 (1975) (prepared by National Research Center of the Arts, Inc.).
224. A. Wr-rLIN, MUSEUMS: IN SEARCH OF A USABLE FUTURE 1 (1970)..
formalized interpretive and educational programs.225
More important than any of these specific functions, the preser-
vation process protects, explains, and enshrines values. 226 It is the
quality of the experience, therefore, not the quantity of consumers
served, that is critical in evaluating the claim of museums to govern-
ment or philanthropic support. As one advocate for the arts has so
aptly observed, "If museum attendance declined 10% this year,
would any of us believe that what we do would be any less important
to our culture?"1
' 227
Fortunately, the American public apparently recognizes that art
objects cannot be equated with TV's or washing machines and that
the role of the museum cannot be adequately measured by the turn-
stile or the dollar sign. According to Americans and the Arts, a sur-
vey sponsored by the National Endowment for the Arts, 89% of the
adult population believe that the arts are important to the quality of
life of their communities.228 In another survey studying the willing-
ness of citizens to pay more taxes to support the arts, many of the
respondants acknowledged that the value of facilities such as muse-
ums and theatres, and the willingness to pay for them, does not nec-
essarily depend upon direct personal use.229
B. The High Cost of Culture
Art activities can be carried on successfully by the private mar-
ketplace, as evidenced by the commercial theatre and the contempo-
rary music business. For the most part, however, the arts possess
some of the characteristics of what economists call "public goods."
A pure public good has two primary features. First, one per-
son's use of it does not preclude others from using it also. Second,
no one can be denied access to it, whether or not he pays for its
use.230 Direct access to most artistic output can be restricted through
market transactions such as admission tickets or the purchase of art
225. Id See also Statement of Charles Van Ravenswaay, Ass'n of Art Museum Directors,
1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 6102.
226. Advocates, supra note 86, at 20-21.
227. Id at 20. Other commentators have also recognized and criticized the importation of
the consumer philosophy into the world of art: "Once art is seen as in the service of the people,
its service is necessarily determined by the numbers of people served. The museums found
themselves measuring the value of their objects by body count." S. BURNHAM, THE ART
CROWD 222 (1973). See also Van Der Haag, Art and the Mass Audience, in MUSEUMS IN
CRISIS 65 (1972) (ed. by Brian O'Doherty).
228. Hightower, 4 Report on the 4rts, in 2 COMMISSION RESEARCH PAPERS supra note 6,
at 714.
229. Nielson, Explanations for Public's Willingness to Fay ,4ddtional Taxes/or SITport of
the Arts, 5 PERF. ARTS REV. 199, 207-08 (1974).
230. D. NETZER, THE SUBSIDIZED MUSE 21 (1978). For a collection of essays discussing
the cost of cultural activities and economic rationales for subsidizing the arts, see THE ECO-
NOMICS OF THE ARTS (1976) (ed. by M. Blaug). See generally R. MUSORAVE & P. MUSGRAVE,
PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 1976).
works, but the consumer cannot be excluded from the indirect bene-
fits, or "externalities," associated with the arts.23' The citizen who
never visits an art museum, for example, cannot be denied the bene-
fit of the economic stimulus to the business community that the pres-
ence of the museum provides. Similarly, contemporary society as a
whole is enriched by the educational activities of museums, and fu-
ture generations gain from the present preservation of both contem-
porary and historical artifacts. 32 The normal market mechanisms
obviously cannot be expected to operate in this context to provide
the optimum output at the appropriate cost.
In addition, the cultural audience is subdivided along interest
and geographical lines. The audience for painting and sculpture, for
example, may not be the same as that for ballet or the symphony.
Although traveling exhibitions occur today with increasing fre-
quency, the products of the museum are not easily or inexpensively
transported across the country. As a result, the non-profit market for
each individual institution is relatively limited. Within each market
some consumers are able to pay the true cost of cultural production;
others are neither able nor willing to pay, and consume at a lower
rate or free of charge.233
Furthermore, the production of art, with its emphasis on quality
and uniqueness, is a highly inefficient process. In today's industral-
ized economy, the spread of automated production continually low-
ers the real cost of other goods and services. Consequently, the
relative cost of art is always on the rise.2 34 Although this should be
less of a problem for museums than for individual artists and the
performing arts institutions that are actually involved in the creative
process itself, scholarship and preservation, the primary "products"
of the museum, are themselves something of artistic endeavors.
Then, too, certain basic costs in storing and caring for the collections
cannot be eliminated or reduced. Dependent on limited incomes
that do not keep pace with inflation, museums have found it increas-
ingly difficult to meet these CoStS.
235
Ironically, the vary expansion of public interest in the arts that
has stimulated the collecting boom and fostered record attendance at
museums, art centers, and cultural events236 has also aggravated the
231. Baumol and Bowen, Arguments for Public Support of the Performing Arts, in THE
ECONOMICS OF THE ARTS 42, 52 (1976). In this situation the good is said to be excludable but
non-rival, that is, exclusion is possible but inefficient. See Musgrave, supra note 230, at 51-53.
232. Professor Netzer also identifies the interdependency of art forms and the encourage-
ment of artistic experimentation as additional external benefits assosiated with the arts. D.
NETZER, THE SUBSIDIZED MUSE 23-4 (1978).
233. A. TOFFLER, THE CULTURE CONSUMERS 161-62 (1964).
234. Id at 163-64.
235. Peter Kyros asserts that most museums would forego government affirmative spend-
ing programs if they could be guaranteed a 2 to 3% rate of inflation. Kyros, supra note 7.
236. See note 219 and accompanying text supra
economic plight of the nation's nonprofit institutions. More people
mean greater costs in serving them. With the advent of the philoso-
phy that museums should be an activist force in the community, new
and additional services have been undertaken to broaden the "cul-
ture constituency. "237
Finally, the aggressive entry of museums into the art market has
itself contributed to the exaggerated prices, but the present inflation-
ery spiral has made it virtually impossible for museums to
compete.238
That the need is pressing can hardly be doubted. Eighteen per-
cent of the art museums in the 1979 Museum Program Survey re-
ported operating deficits, and another 39% merely broke even. Nor
does a balanced budget necessarily indicate financial health. Finan-
cial pressures caused cutbacks in services and staff of fully one-third
of the museums surveyed. Furthermore, earned income accounted
for only 48.4% of the annual operating income. The remainder was
derived from government and private sources. A mere 11.2% of the
earned income for the year came from admission fees.239
237. See notes 220-21, 226-27 and accompanying text supra.
238. Trucco, The WorldArt Market, 79 ART NEWS 102 (1980). The foray into contempo-
rary collecting, in particular, has had a tremendous impact on the values attributed to the
works of living artists. Van Der Haag, Art and the MassAudience, II MUSEUMS IN CRISIS 65,
73-74 (1972) (ed. by Brian O'Doherty). One tax theorist has suggested that the availability of
the charitable deduction serves to underwrite speculative movements in art prices. The argu-
ment is that ordinarily speculative booms in a market price are aborted because of budget
constraints operating on the buyers. In the art market, the government has, in effect, provided
an open-ended subsidy arrangement for gifts of appreciated value to museums, driving up the
speculation price. Brannon, supra note 185, at 2275. A speculative purchase, however, may
not hold up over time as an accurate indicator of fair market value. Furthermore, the elimina-
tion of a charitable deduction or other incentive to giving of art objects (even if replaced by a
provision that would stimulate equal or greater amounts of cash contributions) would tend to
have an inflationary effect on the marketplace since museums would have to compete with
private buyers to purchase works that ordinarily they would receive as gifts.
239. Preliminary Data, supra note 219. Government support was received in the follow-
ing proportions: 14.3% from local governments, 4.8% from the state, and 8.4% from the federal
government. Private sources included 6.3% from individuals, 5.4% from private foundations
and 4.6% from corporate contributors. The remaining 7.7% was categorized as "other" in-
come. Earned income sources were broken down as follows:
admission fees 11.2%








Art museums reported a markedly greater proportion of endowment income than the total
museum sample (universe of 4408, sample of 1357) 33.5% to 22.4% The total museum sample
had a considerably higher percentage of income from admissions, 29.4%
C Financing Culture. Philanthropy versus
Government Expenditure
Once it is determined that an activity is one that is valued by the
community, but which is provided at a suboptimal level because of
market failure, the final issue is the choice of the most effective
means of promoting that activity. For most Americans, the question
is not whether art institutions need or deserve support, but rather
how society should go about providing that assistance.
Traditionally, American's have attended to community needs
through the private sector. The practice of philanthropy, of private
giving, is a fundamental underpinning of our entire social order.2 °
While in most other countries, major social institutions such as
hospitals, schools, libraries, museums and social welfare agencies
are state-owned and state-funded, in the United States many of
the same organizations are privately controlled and voluntarily
supported. The institutional landscape of America is, in fact,
teeming with nongovernmental noncommercial organizations.
24'
From a theoretical viewpoint, if voluntary non-profit organiza-
tions produce an undersupply of the desired social good because ex-
ternal benefits cannot be controlled, direct government provision
could correct the shortfall.242 Yet government action also may not
provide the optimal level since it is determined by preferences ex-
pressed through the political process. The level of government pro-
duction of a social good is determined by the median voter, who has
distributed on each side of him an equal number of voters who pre-
fer either more or less of the particular good. Unless tastes are per-
fectly homogeneous, some voters will desire a greater level of
production and others will prefer a lower output than that selected;
only the median voter will be perfectly satisfied. 43
The argument is essentially one of cultural pluralism. If the arts
are patronized by a minority of the population, it does not follow
240. Alexis de Tocqueville, in his visit to the newly created American republic, observed
the propensity of Americans to form associations and to engage in voluntary collaborative
activities in order to provide basic social services or to accomplish desirable social objectives.
See A. DETocQuEVILLE, JOURNEY TO AMERICA 266 (1971). The volunteer fire company, the
mutual insurance fund, the societies for the promotion of philosophic and scientific endeavors
are all a part of this cultural heritage.
241. Giving in America Toward a Stronger Voluntary Sector; Report on the Filer Commis-
sion on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs - 4 Summary, 115 TR. AND EST. 84, 85 (1976).
242. See Hochman & Rodgers, supra note 80, at 2. The British welfare system is premised
on the rationale that private philanthropy cannot meet the demand for "universal services" of
deserving economic and social needs and that the state must assume primary responsibility
instead of merely filling gaps left by private charity. See Committee on Law and Practice,
Report Relating to Charitable Trusts, CMD. No. 8710 at 10-11 (1952) (the "Nathan Report")
discussed in Sacks, The Role oPhilanthrop,." An Institutional View, 46 VA. L. REV. 516, 522
(1960).
243. Note, Tax Treatment of/Artists' Charitable Contributions, 89 YALE L.J. 144, 153-54
(1979) (applying analysis to contributions of donor-created property). See also Hochman &
Rodgers, supra note 80, at 2.
that the provision of museums and art institutions to serve that seg-
ment of society is any less of a valid goal, nor any less valuable for
society as a whole.
Even the detractors of the current deduction system recognize
the pitfalls of direct "government philanthropy." Individual control
and creativity would be placed in jeopardy by the conservative con-
straints of majoritarian rule. "We sense intuitively that multiple ap-
proaches to problems are desirable; that individuals and
organizations outside government can provide progress and ideas
that might have difficulty surfacing in the government ... .
Because private philanthropy has no generalized public ac-
countability, 245 it is free to indulge in experimental or more individ-
ualized programs or areas of concern that may not have yet achieved
social legitimacy.246 This freedom is particularly crucial in the arts.
Political interference can only lead to culture by committee, and ulti-
mately, to mediocrity.247
In the last analysis, of course, the problem should not be re-
garded as a struggle for supremacy between philanthropy and gov-
ernment. Each has a distinct contribution to make, and an effective
244. McDaniel, supra note 175, at 187.
245. Charitable organizations are commonly viewed as public trusts, thus insuring that the
organization remains within the bounds of its stated purposes and observes the constraints of
public policy. See generally Marsh, Governance of Non-Profit Organizations An Appropriate
Standard of Conductfor Trustees and Directors ofaMuseums and Other Cultural Institutions, 85
DICK. L. REv. 607 (1981).
246. The advantage of voluntary effort over state activity lies in its greater flexibility,
its ability to set new standards or to undertake new work on its own volition, and
without seeking fresh statutory powers; its ability to pioneer. . . to work outwards
from the individual in need of help to the services he needs rather than by the reverse
process of discoverying the individual in providing a service. . . , to attract to it men
and women with a high sense of dedication ready and willing to give themselves to
taxing and specially difficult work .... Voluntary Societies.. . are able to stand
aside from and criticize state action, or inaction, in the interests of the inarticulate
man-in-the-street.
Nathan Report, quoted in Sacks, The Role of Philanthropy; An Institutional View, 46 VA. L.
REV. 516, 522 23 (1960), See also Vidich, Philanthropy, A Significant Institution, in ART MAN-
AGEMENT HANDBOOK 29, 30-32 (1970) (ed. by A. Reiss). According to Sacks, government
action is called for when the required fiscal resources plainly exceed those available to private
groups, and when compelled participation and uniformity of treatment are necessary. Philan-
thropy serves to call attention to the problem until it is publicly recognized. Id at 523-24.
247. The difficulties encountered by the funding programs of the National Endowment for
the Arts (NEA) and the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEA) provide abundant
evidence that direct government intervention is inappropriate in the arts. "The more demo-
cratic the allocation process, the greater the restraint on diversity, minority expression, and
innovation would be. On the other hand, the more the allocation mechanism is insulated from
majoritarian tastes, the more likely the allocation would be biased toward the particular pref-
erences of the officials distributing the funds." Note, Tax Treatment ofArtists' Charitable Con-
tributions, 89 YALE L.J. 144, 154 n.30 (1979). Consequently, the NEA and NEH have been
criticized for being both too elitist and too popularistic. In addition, the subjective nature of
artistic activity makes the formulation of objective criteria for the accountability and control of
public funding virtually impossible and the necessity of bureaucratic machinery raises the cost
of every dollar that reaches the artists and art institutions. See Comment, Mechanismsfor
Control and Distribution of Public Funds to the Art Community, 85 DIcLK. L. REV. 629 (1981).
See also A. TOFFLER, THE CULTURE CONSUMERS 191 (1964).
combination should be forged that offers the best of both methods. 248
The charitable contribution deduction presents just such an integra-
tion of government action and private initiative. 249 The dangers of
government control and over-regulation are avoided, cultural plural-
ism is maximized, and the deficiencies of total dependence on pri-
vate resources are alleviated.
VI. Alternatives and Recommendations
4. Contributions by Collectors
Proposed alternatives to the current charitable deduction provi-
sions have taken a variety of forms. To overcome the difficulties of
direct government expenditures as an alternative, one theorist has
devised a system of matching grants.25° Under this scheme, individ-
ual gifts to charity would trigger matching grants by the federal gov-
ernment to the designated charity or charities. The percentage of the
taxpayer's total income directed to the charity would serve as the
measure, or "donation base," for determining the amount of the di-
rect federal grant. The donation base would equal the individual's
adjusted gross income, increased by items of tax preference that con-
stitute economic income but are presently excluded from adjusted
gross income. This method would avoid favoring higher income tax-
payers who more frequently utilize the Code's tax preferences.25'
Thus, the donor could still control the destination of his gift, absent
the vertical inequity of the present system.
The matching grant proposal, however, would entirely elimi-
nate any incentive effect (except the knowledge that additional bene-
fits will inure to the taxpayer's favorite charity by virtue of his gift)
and would reduce the probability that the gift would take the form of
appreciated property. In addition, a matching grant system might
threaten the present independence and privacy of donors and donees
on the basis that the public has the right to know who controls the
destiny of public funds.252
248. Sacks, The Role of Philanthropy: An Institutional View, 46 VA. L. REV. 516, 524
(1960); Note, Tax Treatment of Artits' Charitable Contributions, 89 YALE L.J. 144, 158 (1979).
249. The median voter is offered a chance to secure additional output of social goods
by paying only his share of the marginal costs necessary to induce high-demand indi-
viduals to increase their amount of contributions. These individuals, who are already
contributing to the total costs of providing supplemental output, are encouraged to
increase their level of contributions through the partial subsidy approved by the me-
dian voter.
Id at 158-59.
250. McDaniel, supra note 175, at 192.
251. Id at 194.
252. Bittker, supra note 159, at 151-52. Professor Bittker emphasizes that privacy sur-
rounding the charitable deduction is an inextricable part of the more generally protected pri-
vacy that is accorded to federal income tax returns. A promise of privacy embodied in a
matching grant system would not be protected by a similar umbrella, because it is "not yet
As previously noted,253 the various tax credit alternatives skew
the benefits of the incentive toward the lower income groups; but by
so doing they raise the possibility that the apportionment of the total
amount of the contributions among the donees will be altered.
Clearly, the solution lies not in reducing the incentive for the
wealthy, but rather in assuring that there are attractive and effective
incentives at all income levels. One proposal combining the present
deduction with a 5% credit for gifts in excess of 6% of the taxpayer's
adjusted gross income would appear to achieve this result.254 The
6% and 5% figures were chosen because they allow the advantages of
the additional premium to be redistributed toward the lower income
brackets 255 while maintaining the incentive for the wealthier classes.
The plan, however, calls for the realization of gain upon the contri-
bution of appreciated property, thereby removing the incentive to
make gifts in that form. Unless it can be demonstrated that the loss
of these gifts will be compensated for by other means, this aspect of
the plan would be detrimental to those institutions that depend on
such gifts, notably museums and libraries.
Other plans retain the current advantages accorded the high tax
bracket individual but add increased incentives for the lower bracket
taxpayer in order to reverse the "upside-down" effect that results
from the graduated tax rates. The Filer Commission, for example,
suggested that families with income below $15,000 a year be allowed
to deduct twice the amount of their giving, and those with incomes
between $15,000 and $30,000 be allowed to deduct 150% of what they
contributed.256 In this way, the range of tax savings between low
and middle income levels and the high income brackets would be
narrowed appreciably.
The most obvious and least disruptive means to increase the in-
centive for lower bracket taxpayers is to allow a charitable deduction
regardless of whether the taxpayer itemizes his personal deductions.
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 accomplished this change,
but on a trial basis only.257
The 1981 amendment restricts the availability of the new direct
charitable deduction 258 to non-itemizing taxpayers.259 Those tax-
sanctified or steeled by history." Id at 151. He also fears that official concepts of right and
wrong will intrude into the administration of the grants, and he predicts congressional investi-
gations and loyalty oaths if a matching grant scheme is implemented. Id at 152.
253. See notes 194-95 and accompanying text supra
254. Brannon, supra note 185.
255. Id at 2278.
256. Commentary on Commission Recommendations, in 1 COMMISSION RESEARCH PAPERS,
supra note 6, at 4-5.
257. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 121, 95 Stat. 196 (1981).
See note 35 supra.
258. The term "direct charitable deduction" or "direct deduction" hereinafter refers to the
deduction permitted by § 121 of the Economic Recovery Tax Act, supra note 257.
payers who elect to itemize must still include their charitable contri-
bution with their other personal deductions and subtract the total
from adjusted gross income in order to reach taxable income. In this
way, the 1981 provision avoids the difficulties that would be created
if a taxpayer could claim a direct charitable deduction and itemize as
well. Several of the itemized personal deductions, such as the medi-
cal and drug expense deductions26 are available for expenses above
a fixed percentage of adusted gross income. If itemizers were per-
mitted to deduct charitable gifts to arrive at adjusted gross income,
an add-back provision would be necessary to prevent an increase in
the number of persons utilizing the medical and drug expense
deductions.26'
Certain taxpayers, however, will receive a windfall tax cut as a
result of the new charitable deduction provision, without increasing
their gifts to charity. For example, a taxpayer who gives $600 to
charity and itemizes $3,500 in personal expenses on a joint return,
including the $600 gift, will be able to claim the $600 charitable de-
duction under the new lawplus the $3,400 standard deduction, or
zero bracket amount, saving $500 in taxes.262
In addition, opponents of the charitable deduction for non-
itemizers point to the complexity and cost of its administration. The
auditing and verification process is particularly troublesome for
smaller donations.263 To ameliorate this administrative difficulty, a
"floor" provision is occasionally proposed, usually 2% or 3% of ad-
justed gross income, below which no contribution would be deducti-
ble. The original proposal for a floor, however, was designed to
promote tax simplification by increasing the number of returns with-
out itemized deductions. In order to accomplish this objective with-
out impairing the availability of the charitable deduction, it was
suggested that any contribution to a public charity in excess of 2% of
adjusted gross income be treated as a deduction directly from gross
income. The first 2% and any gifts to private foundations would re-
main as itemized deductions.26
The proposal to entirely eliminate charitable deductions below
the 2% or 3% level is a distortion of the initial scheme. It would
emasculate the deduction provision and work against liberalizing the
259. "In the case of an individual who does not itemize his deductions for the taxable year,
the applicable percentage of the amount allowable under subsection (a) [Section 170(a)] for the
taxable year shall be taken into account as a direct charitable deduction under section 63."
Economic Recovery Tax Act, supra note 257, § 121(a) (emphasis added).
260. I.R.C. § 213.
261. See Statement of Hon. Donald C. Lubick, Ass't Sec. of Treasury, in 1980 Hearings,
supra note 7, at 65.
262. Id at 64.
263. Id at 65.
264. See Statement of Stanley S. Weithom, on behalf of Nat'l Assembly for Social Policy
and Development, Inc., 1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 6188.
tax advantages for donors of small gifts.265 Even in its original form,
the plan would tend to negate the effect of permitting non-itemizers
to deduct their charitable contribution.
Despite the administrative difficulties and the increased costs,
the extension of the charitable deduction to non-itemizers is a posi-
tive step, and the provision should become a permanent part of the
Code. The issue is not simply the availability of the charitable de-
duction to all income classes, but more importantly, the survival of
the charitable deduction itself, and with it, the viability of private
philanthropy.266 The dwindling number of itemizers increases the
likelihood that a charitable deduction limited to those taxpayers who
itemize will be labelled as a tax loophole.267 As this comment has
demonstrated, the assault has already begun.268
B. Artists' Contributions
Gifts of art by the artist-creator present special problems be-
cause of the great disparity that generally exists between the artist's
cost basis and the fair market value at which he might sell the
work.269  This gap produces the appearance of a considerable
"profit" when the artist donates his own work. Since the Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981 reduced the maximum tax rate to 50%, the
artist can never benefit more by a gift of art than by a sale of his
work.270  The possibility of profit appears only if a comparison is
made with a gift of cash.27 1 Once again, it is urged that the proper
measure of value can only be that which the artist has parted with,
265. For example, the American Symphony Orchestra League reported that 83% of the
gifts to symphony orchestras' annual maintenance funds are in amounts of less than $100,
averaging $37. These small gifts accounted for approximately 40% of the total annual contrib-
uted dollars received by symphony orchestras. Statement of Richard H. Wangerin, President
American Symphony Orchestra League, 1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 6074. Most, of not all,
of the contributions would not qualify for deduction under the "floor" provision.
266. See Statement of June K. Goodman, on behalf of Coalition of National Voluntary
Organizations, 1980 Hearings, supra note 7, at 112: Statement of Hon. Barber B. Conable, Jr.,
Representative from New York State, 1980 Hearings, supra note 7, at 24-25.
267. Id at 24.
268. In particular, see Part IV supra. The European experience with philanthropy is in-
structive. In Sweden and Britain, where tax deductions for individual contributions are not
permitted, the attitude is prevalent that charitable giving is an elitist activity and that philan-
thropic institutions are the private preserves of the wealthy. Kandell, Private Charity Going
Out ofStyle in West Europe's Weyfare States, N.Y. Times, July 2, 1978, reprinted in 1980 Hear-
ings, supra note 7, at 75. A British commission on the future of voluntary organizations re-
ported that England has let its philanthropic tradition and its voluntary agency structure
deteriorate so badly and has come to depend on government funding so completely that the
independent sector may never recover. See Statement of John Gardner, Chairman, Organiz-
ing Committee, Independent Sector, 1980 Hearings, supra note 7, at 80.
269. See note 26 and accompanying text supra.
270. Assuming a basis of $10 and a gift valued at $100, the artist would save $45 in taxes
at the 50% level. If he sold the work, he would pay $45 in taxes on the ordinary income from
the sale. His after-tax profit would equal $45.
271. See note 19 and accompanying text supra The principle illustrated in note 19 using
capital gain property applies equally as well to ordinary income property.
and in this instance, he will have made a considerable sacrifice by
giving his work instead of selling it on the market.
The fear is, of course, that the artist will give a work that he is
unable to sell. In reality, this problem should arise only infre-
quently. The institution of the related use rules should curtail
"dumping" of such works on charitable organizations other than
museums and art centers, i.e., hospitals and schools.27 2 In the mu-
seum context, the normal selection process will prevent a gift, quite
often even the gift of a saleable item, since most museums are seek-
ing only the work of established artists.2 73 Even should an artist's
unsaleable gift be accepted, 74 the problem is clearly one of valua-
tion,275 and not an abuse of the deduction.
The charitable deduction for donor-created property can be
viewed as a reward for excellence, as well as an inducement neces-
sary to secure the work of the most highly regarded artists for the
benefit of posterity. 276 Those who espouse this position argue that
the fair market value rule should be restored in full for works
donated by artists.277 Others object that the difference between cost
to the artist and market price is a measure of the artist's labor, analo-
gous to donations of services, which are not deductible.278 Further-
more, a fair market value standard for donor-created property would
discriminate against art dealers, who also donate ordinary income
property. Dealers, however, can avail themselves of the collector's
272. See notes 81-90 and accompanying text supra.
273. Smaller art centers and regional museums may collect the art of less established art-
ists working in their local communities, but these gifts must be considered bona fide, since a
benefit is being conferred on the institution and the community.
274. The possibility is most likely to occur when an established artist holds an exhibition
that is not a sell-out. He might then offer an unsold work to a museum at his original asking
price instead of selling it at a reduced price at a later time. See C. GOODMAN, supra note 45, at
275. It is also a valuation question when an inferior work is given to a university collec-
tion for study purposes.
276. The social benefit, and the justification for a disparity in the treatment of taxpayers, is
most clear in the case of gifts of the papers of artists, composers and writers to archives and
libraries. These objects are most susceptible to the ravages of time, and if they are not pre-
served, may be lost forever. See Statement of Authors League of America, 1973 Hearings,
supra note 7, at 6111. See also Statement of Elie Siegmeister, Chairman of the Council of
Creative Artists, Libraries and Museums, 1973 learings, supra note 7, at 6030.
277. See, e.g., H.R. 10329, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); H.R. 1759, 95th Cong., Ist Sess.
(1977); H.R. 2016, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). No action was taken on any of these bills.
Other arguments for the restoration of the benefit rest on the basis that the current law
unfairly discriminates against artists in comparison to other holders of ordinary income prop-
erty who are entitled to deduct their higher costs. See Beghe, supra note 22, at 519. The
disparity would be offset if a fair market value deduction were permitted for artists, but not for
other holders of ordinary income property.
278. The proponents of the deduction rebut this argument by pointing out that one of the
reasons for the disallowance of a deduction for donation of services is the administrative diffi-
culty of accurately and equitably measuring that value. The artist's gift, in contrast, is embod-
ied in property capable of objective evaluation. Statement of Elias Newman, President, Artists
Equity Association of New York and Chairman, Conference of American Artists, 1973 Hear-
ings, supra note 7, at 6143-44.
deduction if they have segregated the donated items from their gen-
eral stock-in-trade.279
Numerous formulations have been proposed to equalize the tax
incentives currently provided for artist and collector donors. Most of
the plans involve a reduction of the allowable deduction by a certain
percentage, generally that equal to the amount by which the appreci-
ation would be taxable if it were realized upon the sale of capital
gain property.280 One proposal would allow a deduction equal to
cost basis plus 75% of the appreciation,28' presumably to reflect the
commissions that most artists pay to their dealers out of the sale
price.282 It is also occasionally suggested that the deduction be lim-
ited to the extent of the artist's income from sales of his work or that
it be directly allocated as a deduction against such income.283 A pro-
vision of that nature would impact harshly on lower income artists
who generally rely on other sources to supplement their livelihood.
Another measure that had received considerable support is the
so-called "Tax Equity" Bill introduced in 1979 by Senator Javits.284
The Javits bill provided for a tax credit equal to 30% of the value of
the artist's gift of his work, up to 50% of his tax liability unless it is
less than $2,500, but in no event for any contribution in excess of
$35,000 in one taxable year.285 Like the other tax credit systems pro-
posed as alternatives for the deduction, this provision would increase
the incentive for those individuals in income brackets below 30%,
but for others a sale of the work would prove more advantageous.
More equitable and logical treatment for the artist, at least from
a theoretical viewpoint, is afforded by a recent proposal to separate
the ordinary income and capital gains portions of the appreciation in
the value of a contributed art object. Under this "quasi-capital
gains" scheme, creators could elect to have their compositions ap-
praised upon completion. At the date of gift, they would pay a tax at
279. If a dealer withdraws an art work from his gallery, keeps it in his home, separately
insures it, and treats it at all times as completely apart from his business, he should be able to
establish that he does not hold such items as "stock in trade" and thereby qualify for the full
fair market deduction. See Statement of Ralph F. Colin, Admin. Vice-Pres. Art Dealers Asso-
ciation of America, Inc., 1973 tHearing, supra note 7, at 6097.
280. See, e.g., H.R. 3152, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973), which provided for a 50% reduction.
Presumably the percentage would be adjusted as the capital gains deduction, currently 60%, is
changed from time to time.
281. See, e.g., S. 1435, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 6057, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1978);
H.R. 6764, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
282. Baldwin, Art and Money." Acting to Reform the Tax Reform Act, 64 ART iN AMERICA
40, 41 (1976). A work sold would normally yield more than 25% in a commission for the
dealer. The Service currently permits the deduction of fair market value without a reduction
for the amount of the sales commission. Treas. Reg. § 1. 170A- I(c)(1).
283. See Beghe, supra note 22, at 522. The purpose of such a limitation is to prevent
hobbyists from taking advantage of the deduction, i, but the related use rules would seem to
serve the same function. See notes 272-273 and accompanying text supra.
284. S. 1078, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
285. Id §440.
ordinary income rates on the difference between cost basis and the
fair market value at the time of completion.286 This portion of the
value of the work at the time of donation would represent that part
of the item's value attributable to the non-deductible contribution of
services by the artist.287 The artist exercising this option would then
be entitled to deduct the full fair market value of the property at the
date of gift, less forty percent of the unrealized appreciation that ac-
crued between the time of contribution and the time of comple-
tion.288 This portion of the fair market value would thus be dealt
with in a fashion similar to the tax treatment of capital gain property
donated by collectors.289 For convenience, a mechanical allocation
rule could be employed that would treat the ordinary income com-
ponent as having accrued over a one year period; the total apprecia-
tion would then be allocated pro rata between ordinary income and
capital gains.29°
The obvious objection to this proposal is the complexity that it
introduces into the deduction scheme, particularly when proper val-
uation is already a hotly contested issue. Other provisions of the
Code, however, require equally complicated calculations, such as
special use valuation.29' Furthermore, since the artist must take the
initiative if he is to take advantage of the deduction, this very com-
plexity might deter abuse.
Regardless of the merits of these various proposals, any attempt
to institute a special deduction scheme for artists (or for ordinary
income property generally) now seems to be a pointless exercise in
merely theoretical considerations. The main objection to the deduc-
tion for artists' in-kind contributions was always that an artist could
make more money by giving a gift than by selling his work. That
possibility has been eliminated by the reduction of the maximum tax
rate to 50%.292 From the standpoint of administrative practicality,
restoration of the deduction without alteration is the simplest solu-
tion. It is also the most effective incentive.
286. Note, Tax Treatment of Artists' Charitable Contributions, 89 YALE L.J. 144, 165
(1979).
287. Id at 167.
288. Id at 165. The originator of the "quasi-capital gains" proposal believes that a full
fair market deduction for related use donations of capital gain property by collectors is incon-
sistent with horizontal equity because it discriminates between cash and property contribu-
tions. Since the author of this comment feels that the "logic" of the Code may be dispensed
with for reasons previously discussed, see Part IV. A. 1, supra, the 40% reduction should be
eliminated to provide for consistent treatment of artists and collectors.
289. Id at 167 and n.61.
290. Id at 168 n.57. The artist could choose instead to submit proof of value at the date
of completion.
291. See I.R.C. § 2032A.
292. See note 270 supra,
VII. Conclusion
The deduction for charitable contributions has been attacked as
an inequitable and inefficient incentive. The fair market value meas-
ure of valuation for gifts of appreciated property has been criticized
as permitting unwarranted benefits. Gifts of art, in particular, have
been the focus of concern because of numerous inflated deductions
claimed by taxpayers who donate art objects.
These criticisms have prompted proposals to eliminate the fair
market value standard for gifts of capital gain property, or the entire
charitable deduction itself. Economic studies have shown, however,
that the charitable deduction does provide an incentive toward in-
creased giving. Moreover, the charges of inequity are largely misdi-
rected. The greater benefits accorded wealthier taxpayers by the
system encourage the disgorgement of wealth, thereby accomplish-
ing a redistribution of resources. The progressivity of philanthropic
contribution is a far more positive goal than the progressivity of tax-
ation, and the recent extension of the charitable deduction to non-
itemizers increases the incentive for lower income groups.
Changes in the Code over the past several years have made it
virtually impossible for any taxpayer to gain more by giving away a
work of art than by selling it. The fair market value standard is,
therefore, an appropriate measure of value for contributions of art
objects, and any abuses of the charitable deduction can be controlled
by stricter review and enforcement procedures. Eventually, the valu-
ation of art objects may become no more difficult or imponderable
than the current process of precisely determining the proper deduc-
tion for an individual parcel of real estate.
Thus, on the one hand, the objections to the current charitable
deduction system can be countered convincingly. The arguments for
its retention and extension, on the other hand, are compelling. In
this time of reduced government spending, it is particularly absurd
to consider curtailing incentives to charitable giving. Instead, the
philanthropic sector should be encouraged and strengthened. Com-
munity participation and individual initiative have always been the
hallmarks of the democratic system, insuring-that various viewpoints
are heard and alternative ideas put to trial. The charitable deduction
fosters these ideals.
Even if the proposed "reforms" would make the tax system
more equitable from a theoretical standpoint, would the cost to mu-
seums, libraries, symphonies, and other cultural institutions be a
price the American people are willing to pay? Museums and art or-
ganizations are not the preserves of the wealthy, but the public care-
takers of this country's cultural heritage. Impairing their ability to
perform this function would be a grevious blow to the fabric of soci-
ety, and the loss of their services would be irreparable.
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